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I. INTRODUCTION 
Commentators1 and judges2 have frequently criticized 
Supreme Court decisions involving statutory construction. That 
criticism is especially sharp when the statute to be interpreted 
involves the requisite mens rea to be applied to various elements 
of a criminal offense. 3 Despite the recognition that the Supreme 
Court's case law is "ad hoc" and confusing, Congress has 
compounded the problem by enacting new statutes using the same 
grammatical constructions that produced the "ad hoc" results in the 
past.4 In addition, Congress has consistently refused to enact a 
general culpability provision which might give guidance to lower 
1. See Shirley S. Abrahamson and Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? 
Steps for Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 
1045, 1048 (1991); see also William S. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 324 
(1990); Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory 
Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement and the Problem of 
Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767, 768 (1991); Burt Neuborne, 
Background Nonns for Federal Statutory Interpretation, 22 CONN. L. REV. 721, 
723-24 (1990); W. David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring 
Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383, 384 
(1992); Craig W. Dallon, Note, Interpreting Statutes Faithfully--Not 
Dynamically, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1353, 1353-54; Bruce R. Grace, Note, 
Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1392-93 (1986). 
2. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434-43 (1985) (White, 
J., dissenting); see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 230-32 (1957) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
3. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 434-43 (White, J., dissenting); see also 
Lambert, 355 U.S. at 230-32 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
4. See discussion infra notes 286-358 and accompanying text. 
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courts faced with complex federal criminal statutes. s 
42 U.S.C. § 6928 of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act6 (RCRA or the Act) provides a case study in 
confusion. In 1980, Congress added stepped up criminal 
sanctions, making violations of the original 1976 Act felonies 
rather than misdemeanors, in part to interest the FBI in 
investigating violations of the act.7 The 1980 amendments made 
violations of the act felonious if the acts were committed 
knowingly.8 During the 1980's, panels of the Third, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits decided cases raising questions about the scope 
of the mens rea term.9 The Third and Ninth Circuits came to 
opposite conclusions concerning the same subsection of the Act10 
while the Eleventh Circuit interpreted a related subsection in a 
manner that suggested yet a third approach to the same statutory 
construction problem. 11 More recently, the Fourth and Fifth 
Circuits have read 42 U.S.C. § 6928 narrowly. 12 
5. See, e.g., S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (known as 
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 it contained general culpability provisions, 
but was never enacted). 
6. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S. C.§ 6928 (1992). 
7. See Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1992)); see 
also The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3256 § 232(a)(3) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
6928( d) (1992)) (increasing criminal sanctions for conviction under § 6928( d) 
from $25,000 to $50,000 for each day of violation; allowing imprisonment for 
up to two years rather than one; and increasing maximum punishment for a 
second conviction under §§ ( d)(2) to double the fine or imprisonment term 
for the first conviction). 
8. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 
94 Stat. 2334, 2340 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1992)). 
9. United States v. Johnson and Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 
1983), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); 
United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 
1083 (1990); United States v. Hayes lot '1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
10. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665; Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039. 
11. Hayes lnt 'I, 786 F.2d at 1502. 
12. United States v. Dee, 913 F.2d 741,745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
111 St. Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 613 (5th Cir. 
1991). 
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In 1989, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in United States 
v. Hojlin, 13 thereby missing an opportunity to resolve the 
multi-circuit conflict in an area of increasing prosecutorial 
interest. 14 In addition, a grant of certiorari would have given the 
Supreme Court another opportunity to bring order to a recurring 
problem of statutory construction that has cut across the criminal 
law for decades. The problem is especially significant now 
because the Court, 15 Congress, 16 and a wide array of 
commentators17 have shown an increased recognition that criminal 
sanctions should be reserved for culpable individuals. At the same 
time, Congress and the executive have shown increased political 
awareness to environmental criminal laws.18 The proper 
interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 presents a sharp conflict 
between those competing values. 
This article reviews the circuit court cases interpreting 42 
U.S.C. § 6928 and examines the statute's language and legislative 
history. Despite the Ninth Circuit's conclusion to the contrary, the 
language of the act is ambiguous. 19 The best evidence of that 
fact is the array of cases interpreting similar statutes that come to 
13. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989). 
14. See Robert I. McMurry and Stephen D. Ramsey, Environmental 
Crime: The Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Environmental Laws, 19 
LoY. LA. L. REV. 1133, 1134-45 (1986); see also Paul G. Nittoly, 
Environmental Criminal Cases: The Dawn of a New Era, 21 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1125,1125-26 (1991); Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental Crimes, 
13 B. C. ENVTI... AFF. L . REV. 379, 379-84 (1986); Judith lanelli, Note, 
Lessening the Mens Rea Requirement for Hazardous Waste Violations, 16 VT. 
L. REV. 419, 426-34 (1991). 
15. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985). 
16. See 126 CONG. REC. H3367-68 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980) (statement 
of Mr. Madigan). 
17. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02 commentary at 227-233 (1985); but see 
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.05 commentary at 281-84 (allowing for strict liability 
when the offense is a violation, the penalty for which would only be a fine). 
18. See Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for 
Environmental Crimes, 21 ST. MARY's L. J. 821, 822-23 (1990); see also 
Karen M. Hansen, ''Knowing" Environmental Crimes, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 987, 987 n.1 (1990); McMurray, supra note 14, at 1140-44; Starr, supra 
note 18, at 380-81. 
19. See discussion infra notes 185-255 and accompanying text. 
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inconsistent results. Once a statute is found ambiguous, the 
Supreme Court has held, the lower court should turn to legislative 
history. 20 Therefore, this article examines the legislative history 
for guidance to the correct interpretation of the Act. This 
legislative history is unilluminating and demonstrates that Congress 
reserved to the courts the role of defining the meaning of the 
language of the act. 21 In effect, Congress urged the Court to do 
what it has done in this area before, i.e., to look to Supreme Court 
cases that have been inconsistent and ad hoc, 22 instead of giving 
clear guidance on how the act ought to be interpreted. 
Therefore, this article examines the Supreme Court's general 
approach to interpreting statutes that contain a "knowing" mens rea 
and attempts to identify how 42 U.S.C. § 6928 might be 
interpreted consistently with that line of cases. Distinct themes 
emerge, though, when one examines the relevant precedent. For 
example, in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical 
Corp., 23 the Court interpreted a similar provision consistent with 
a presumption that ignorance of the law is no defense. More 
recently, however, in Liparota v. United States,24 the Court 
ignored the presumption that ignorance of law is no defense and 
found more persuasive the argument that criminal conduct must be 
premised on a finding of culpability. 
This article addresses the tension between those two 
background assumptions of the criminal law and analyzes how they 
play out in a 42 U.S.C. § 6928 prosecution.25 It argues that in 
light of clear developments in the criminal law over the past 
several decades, the claim that ignorance of the law is no defense 
is grossly exaggerated and is a much less useful guide to 
interpreting criminal statutes than the abiding notion that criminal 
20. Moskal v. United States, 498 U .S. 103, 114-15 (1990); see discussion 
infra notes 255-84 and accompanying text. 
21. See discussion infra notes 286-358 and accompanying text. 
22. See discussion infra notes 293-365 and accompanying text. 
23. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U. 
s. 558, 563 (1971). 
24. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985). 
25. See discussion infra notes 359-93 and accompanying text. 
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liability should be conditioned on blameworthy conduct. 26 
In the past, Congress has been unable to codify federal 
criminal law. v But in light of its repeated inability to draft 
clearly worded statutes and to debate coherently the complex 
problems addressed in federal courts, Congress should attempt the 
less onerous task of adopting a general culpability provision. 28 
To demonstrate the soundness of such an enterprise, this article 
discusses how a provision like Model Penal Code § 2.02 would 
have made more coherent and principled the lower courts' job in 
the relevant cases. 
Finally, this article challenges the common assumption that 
strict liability is necessary to protect the environment. Failing to 
allow a defendant to negate knowledge of a permit requirement 
may impose criminal liability on a defendant lacking a culpable 
state of mind. 29 In light of the wide array of enforcement devices 
in modem federal regulatory schemes, the federal government can 
pursue the legitimate goal of protecting the environment without 
criminalizing non-culpable offenders. 30 
II. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 OF THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND 
RECOVERY ACT (RCRA) 
Originally enacted in 1976, the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act has been described as the "primary statute regulating 
hazardous waste. "31 Congress designed a "cradle-to-grave" 
system to manage and monitor hazardous waste. Specifically, 
RCRA regulates the creation, storage, transportation and disposal 
26. See discussion infra notes 359-93 and accompanying text. 
27. See Louis B. Schwartz, Refonn of the Federal Criminal Laws: 
Issues, Tactics and Prospects, 1977 DUKE L. J. 171, 174-82 (1977). 
28. See, e.g., S. 1722, %th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (attempting to 
provide a general culpability provision in a bill known as the Criminal Code 
Reform Act of 1979. This bill was never enacted). See discussion supra note 
5 and accompanying text. 
29. See discussion infra notes 198-99, 240-47 and accompanying text. 
30. See discussion infra notes 394-420 and accompanying text. 
31. See Starr, supra note 14, at 386; see also Fromm, supra note 18, at 
825-32. 
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of hazardous waste. 32 
The party that creates the hazardous waste must notify the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that it has created a 
hazardous waste. The EPA gives the applicant an identification 
number for manifesting purposes. 33 "[The] manifest is the form 
used to identify the quantity, composition, origin, routing and 
destination of hazardous waste during its transportation from point 
of generation to the point of disposal, treatment or storage. "34 In 
addition to the manifest system, a facility that "treats, stores or 
disposes of hazardous waste" must obtain a permit establishing 
standards for handling hazardous waste. 35 
RCRA also regulates transporters of hazardous waste. 36 
The firm that transports the waste to a disposal site is required to 
sign the manifest. 37 It is also required to transport the waste only 
to a facility that has secured the appropriate permit to dispose of 
the waste. 38 That facility in tum must sign and return a copy of 
the manifest to the original generator of the hazardous waste. 39 
Early enforcement efforts under RCRA were primarily civil in 
large part due to a lack of adequate resources and due to the lack 
of significant criminal sanctions under the Act. 40 By the late 
1970's federal officials and the public were made aware of "the 
potential severity of the environmental danger resulting from 
unscrupulous operators' illegal disposal of hazardous waste. "41 
Highly publicized environmental disasters like Love Canal i_n 
Niagara Falls, New York, and the Valley of Drums in 
32. Fromm, supra note 14, at 825. 
33. Starr, supra note 14, at 385-87. 
34. Starr, supra note 14, at 386 n.17. 
35. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
6928( d)(2)(A). 
36. Starr, supra note 14, at 386 (observing that transporters of 
hazardous waste are also regulated by the Dept. of Transportation). 
37. Id. at 387. 
38. Id. at 386. 
39. Id. at 387. 
40. McMurry, supra note 14, at 1138. 
41. Id. 
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Shepardsville, Kentucky, increased pressure on Congress to act. 42 
During hearings before Congress, for example, one federal official 
testified that "(w]e do not know where the millions of tons of stuff 
is going. We feel that the things that have turned up like the Love 
Canal and Kin-Buc situation are simply the tip of the iceberg. We 
do not have the capacity at this time really to find out what is 
actually happening. "43 
In 1980, Congress amended RCRA,44 as a partial response 
to the increased concern about environmental risks. 45 The 
amendments were largely "fine tuning" of RCRA' s substantive 
provisions. 46 The most significant change effected by the 
amendments, in keeping with the increased public interest in 
deterring contamination of the environment, was the increased 
criminal sanctions for violations of the Act.47 
RCRA provides for a wide array of enforcement devices, 
including compliance orders, civil penalties, and injunctive 
relief.48 The 1980 amendments added felony penalties which 
committed the resources of the Justice Department and the FBI to 
the detection and prosecution of environmental crimes. 49 
According to Congressman Florio, "[o]ne of the things the Justice 
Department is very interested in is getting the assistance of the FBI 
42. See 126 CONG. REC. H3345, 48 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980) 
(statement of Mr. Florio). 
43. Christopher Harris et al., Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal 
Hazardous Waste Law: The Knowledge of Corporations and Their Executives, 
23 WAKE FORESf L. REV. 203, 206 (1988). 
44. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 
94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901(a)-(d)(1992), 6928(d) 
(1992)). 
45. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and 
Liability Act (Superfund), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1983); see also Harris, supra note 
43, at 206. 
46. Harris, supra note 43, at 206. 
47. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-482,94 Stat. 2334 (codified as amendment at 42 U . S. C.§ 6928(d) (1992)); 
see also Harris, supra note 43, at 206-07. 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1987) (current version at 42 U .S.C. § 6928 
(1992)). 
49. 126 CONG. REC. H3368 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980) (statement of Mr. 
Mikulski). 
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in certain instances, especially interstate commerce. The FBI either 
has an official policy or an unofficial policy of not becoming 
involved in misdemeanors. "50 Upgrading the penalty provisions 
would commit greater FBI resoures to "tracking down some of 
these people. "51 
Congress made criminal a variety of acts surrounding the 
treating, storing, and transporting of hazardous waste. 
Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) provides: 
Any person who --
(1) knowingly transports or causes to be 
transported any hazardous waste identified or 
listed under this subchapter to a facility which 
does not have a permit under [relevant 
provisions of federal law] . . . 
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any 
[specified] hazardous waste . . . 
(A) without a permit under [relevant 
provisions of federal law]; or 
(B) in knowing violation of any material 
condition or requirement of such 
permit . .. 
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine 
. . . or imprisonment not to exceed two 
years (five years in the case of a violation of 
paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. 52 
Congress amended the penalty provision in 1984 to increase the 
fine and to provide for maximum terms of imprisonment "not to 
exceed two years (five years in the case of a violation of paragraph 
(1) or (2)). "53 
Moreover in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e), Congress added an 
50. Id. (statement of Mr. Florio). 
51. Id. 
52. 42 u.s.c. § 6928(d) (1992). 
53. Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-616, 98 Stat. 3221, 3257 § 232(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(d) (1992)). 
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enhanced criminal provision for a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) 
if the actor not only violated the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(d), but did so with the knowledge that his violation "places 
another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily 
injury .... "54 A violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) can result in 
imprisonment of up to fifteen years and/or a fine of not more than 
$250,000.55 
III. THE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF SECTION 6928(d) 
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) has been the subject of dispute in 
several circuits. The Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits have 
interpreted the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), making it 
criminal if a person "knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any 
hazardous waste . . . (A) without a permit . . . . "56 The 
Eleventh Circuit has construed 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l), making it 
a crime for a person to knowingly transport hazardous waste "to 
a facility which does not have a permit . . . . "57 The various 
circuits have taken inconsistent approaches on the question relating 
to mens rea. Three distinct positions have emerged on what the 
actor must know or how far down the sentence the knowledge term 
runs. 58 
A. United States v. Johnson & Towers 
In United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc. ,59 the corporate 
54. 42 u.s.c. § 6928. 
55. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e). 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). See United States v. Johnson & 
Towers, Inc., 742 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984), ce/1. denied sub nom. Angel v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th 
Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307, 1307-08 (1990); United States v. 
Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 414-15 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 
1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990). 
57. · 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A); see United States v. Hayes Int •1 Corp., 
786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986). 
58. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25 n.7 (1985). 
59. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 
1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
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defendant owned a facility where its employees repaired large 
motor vehicles. That activity generated industrial waste governed 
by RCRA.60 Johnson & Towers employees drained waste 
chemicals into a holding tank, but then pumped the hazardous 
waste into Parker's Creek, a tributary of the Delaware River. The 
corporation had neither applied for nor obtained a permit to do, as 
required by RCRA.61 
A grand jury indicted the corporation and two employees, a 
foreman and a service manager in the trucking department. The 
two employees were alleged to have "'managed, supervised and 
directed a substantial portion of Johnson & Towers' operations . 
. . including those related to the treatment, storage, and disposal 
of the hazardous waste and pollutants' and that the chemicals were 
discharged by 'the defendants and others at their direction. "'62 
The district court dismissed the alleged violations of 42 
U.S.C. § 6928(d) on the ground that RCRA's criminal provisions 
apply only to "owners and operators" of a facility.63 The Third 
Circuit reversed the district court's order and held that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6928 applied to "any person," including employees. 64 It did so 
based on the plain language of the Act and on the view that a more 
limited application of the Act would undermine RCRA by 
exempting employees who are responsible for handling regulated 
material. 65 
Because the court remanded the case for trial on the section 
6928(d) violations, it also addressed the mens rea question in order 
to guide the lower court's interpretation of the Act. 66 
As developed in more detail below, 67 the Third Circuit's 
interpretation of the mens rea term is appropriate in light of the 
many people who might otherwise be found in violation of the Act 
without significant culpability. In other words, limiting the term 
60. Id. at 663-64. 
61. Id. at 664. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. /d. at 665. 
65. Id. at 667. 
66. [d. 
67. See discussion infra notes 240-47 and accompanying text. 
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"person" to owners or operators would have guaranteed that the 
defendant would be in a position to know about the permit 
requirement and to make a reasoned business decision about 
procuring a permit. By expanding the term "person, "68 the court 
left open the possibility that lower eschelon employees, acting 
under orders of supervisors, could be found guilty even though 
they had no reason to know that a permit was required and that 
one was not procured. 
On the mens rea question, the government argued that all it 
had to prove was that the defendant is a "person," that the 
defendant handled hazardous material, and that no one had 
obtained a permit for the disposal or treatment of the waste. 69 
In fact, the government's position was draconian. The key 
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2), provides that a person is guilty 
if he "knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste 
••• .''
70 Under the government's view, the term "knowingly," 
an adverb, would modify the verbs, "treats, stores, or 
disposes. "71 Presumably, almost anyone who treated or disposed 
of a substance would be engaging in conduct of which he was 
aware. He might not know the nature of the substance, but that 
would not be required under the government's interpretation of the 
Act. A second example demonstrates how extreme the 
government's position was. A defendant might be storing an 
object without any knowledge of its nature. An employee at a 
large facility may not know that drums of hazardous waste are 
stored on the facility at all. But under the government's 
interpretation of the Act, the defendant would be guilty as soon as 
he knew that he was storing an object which, coincidentally, 
turned out to be hazardous waste. 
Under the government's view, the sweep of the Act would be 
broad indeed. In the hypothetical suggested above a large 
corporation might have any number of employees who had 
responsibility for storing hazardous waste. They might be aware 
68. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665 (defining "person" to be that as 
provided in 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15), a broad definition) . 
69. Id. at 667. 
70. 42 u.s.c. § 6928(d)(2). 
71. Johnson & Towers, 742 F.2d at 667. 
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that something was being stored, but might have no idea what the 
substance was and might not even have any reason to inquire. 
Because the Third Circuit believed the term "knowingly" 
would be superfluous if it modified only "treats, stores, or 
disposes," it concluded that "[a]t a minimum, the word 
'knowingly' ... must also encompass knowledge that the waste 
material is hazardous. "72 
To that point, the Third Circuit's analysis has not produced 
significant disagreement. 73 What followed though has proved to 
be the most difficult issue of statutory construction. The lower 
court had already found that there was no requirement that the 
actor had to know that he was "acting without a permit or in 
violation of the law. "74 Conceding that the Act was a public 
welfare statute, the court correctly concluded that fact is not 
dispositive on whether Congress intended to impose a mens rea 
requirement.75 Instead, it looked at the parallel provision of the 
Act, that is, subsection 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B) which 
specifically provides that a person must knowingly treat hazardous 
waste "in knowing violation of any material condition ... of such 
permit. "76 It argued that it would be arbitrary to treat violators 
under subsections (A) and (B) differently. The court reasoned that 
Congress could not have intended to hold criminally liable those 
persons who acted when no permit had been obtained irrespective 
of their knowledge but not those persons who acted in violation of 
the terms of a permit unless that action was knowing.77 
Thus, the court concluded that "knowingly" attached to the 
requirement of having a permit under section 6928(d)(2)(A). 
72. ld. at 668 (relying on United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. 
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563-64 (1943)). 
73. United States v. Hayes Int •1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1506 (11th Cir. 
1986); see also United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 416 (5th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 493 U .S. 1083 (1990). 
74. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668 (summarizing the conclusions 
of the District Court). 
75. Id. But see Hansen, supra note 18, at 1004-70. 
76. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B). 
n. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. 
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Specifically, on that reading, the government had to prove more 
than the fact that the defendant knew that his employer stored or 
disposed of waste that he knew to be hazardous. It had to prove 
that the defendant knew that his employer was required to have 
and did not have a permit.78 
Johnson &: Towers is not without ambiguity. For example, 
in separate sections of · the opinion, the court characterizes its 
holding in different ways. Thus, when first summarizing its 
holding, the court stated that an employee "can be subject to 
criminal prosecution only if [he] knew or should have known that 
there had been no compliance with the permit requirement . . . 
• "
79 But in concluding, the court stated that the district court 
must instruct the jury that the defendant must have actual 
knowledge. 80 The court also created potential confusion both by 
holding that the government must show that the defendant knew 
that a permit was required, 81 but also asserting that "under certain 
regulatory statutes requiring 'knowing' conduct the government 
need prove only knowledge of the actions taken and not of the 
statute forbidding them. "82 
Especially in light of the court's conclusion that the Act 
applied to any person who treated, stored, or disposed of 
hazardous waste, the court's conclusion that the term "knowingly" 
would attach to all of the material elements of the offense serves 
as a reasonable limitation on the possible applications of the Act. 
Specifically one might envision any number of corporate 
78. ld. at 669. Sloviter, J., writing for the majority, argued that the 
government's burden was lowered. However, the court characterizes the 
knowledge requirement differently, id. See, e.g., id. at 664-65, holding that 
"should have known" is the standard where defendant is an employee. 
79. ld. at 665 (emphasis added). 
80. ld. at 664. The Supreme Court has noted that knowledge requires 
subjective awareness. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29 
(1970). Not all courts make that distinction; see also Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Smith, 1961 App. Cas. 290, 327 (1960); ALI, MODEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.02 commentary at 234 (1985) (discussing Director of Public 
Prosecutions v. Smith, 1961 App. Cas. 290 (1960). 
81. Johnson &: Towers, 741 F.2d at 669. 
82. !d. at 669 (citing United States v. lot' I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 
402 u.s. 558, 563 (1971)). 
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employees who literally treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste 
whose conduct is not culpable. For example, a forklift driver who 
stacks drums of hazardous waste in violation of the law has done 
nothing blameworthy unless he has reason to know that his conduct 
violates the law. 83 In many instances, the handling of hazardous 
waste is socially accepted conduct -- for example, Congress has 
not outlawed generation of hazardous waste. Indeed, Congress has 
made some treatment and handling of hazardous waste entirely 
legal as long as it is done within the terms of a permit. 84 
Johnson & Towers' interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 does 
require the government to establish individual culpability in that 
the actor had to be aware that his conduct was in violation of the 
law. At the same time, the court underscored that, as is often the 
case in a regulated industry, a jury is entitled to infer that a person 
in a position of responsibility is in fact aware of regulations and 
can disbelieve that person's denial of knowledge. 85 
B. United States v. Hayes International Corp. 
In United States v. Hayes International, Corp. ,86 the 
corporate defendant operated an airplane refurbishing plant. The 
company generated two waste products covered by the Act, jet fuel 
drained from planes on which work was to be performed, and a 
mixture of solvents and paint resulting from the cleaning of spray 
paint guns with solvents. 87 
In 1981, defendant L.H. Beasley, a Hayes International 
employee, contracted with an employee of Performance 
Advantage, Inc., a "recycler," to remove the hazardous waste. 
Performance Advantage agreed to pay Hayes International twenty 
cents a gallon for the jet fuel and to remove the solvent-paint mix 
83. Proponents of strict liability generally recognize that the offender 
is not culpable, but seek to justify punishment on other utilitarian grounds. 
See discussion infra notes 253-54, 394-401 and accompanying text. 
84. 42 u.s.c. § 6925. 
85. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669 (citing/nt'/ Minerals, 402 U.S. 
at 569). 
86. United States v. Hayes Int 'I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). 
87. /d. at 1500. 
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free of charge. 88 
Jack Hurt, the Performance employee who negotiated the 
purchase of the jet fuel, apparently told Beasley that he would take 
away some of the paint waste to determine whether it could be 
converted into fuel. 89 He later told Beasley that Performance did 
not want the waste, but Beasley stood pat on the original deal.90 
Performance continued to accept the paint waste, but illegally 
disposed of it. Government officials found about six hundred 
drums deposited at seven illegal disposal sites in Georgia and 
Alabama. 91 
A grand jury indicted a number of individuals, including 
Beasley, and the corporate defendant, Hayes International. 92 
Hayes International and Beasley were charged with violating both 
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), making it unlawful to knowingly treat, 
store, or dispose of hazardous waste without a permit, and 42 
U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l), making it unlawful for a person to 
"knowingly transportO any hazardous waste identified or listed 
under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit 
under [other provisions of RCRA]. "93 The district court directed 
a verdict of acquittal on the 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) charge at 
the close of the government's case. 94 It also set aside the jury's 
verdict on the 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l) count of the indictment and 
granted a verdict of acquittal. 95 The Eleventh Circuit reversed 
the district court's judgment of acquittal. 96 
The issues on appeal related to RCRA' s knowledge 
requirement. rn The court addressed whether the term 
"knowingly" attached to the different elements of 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(d)(l). It first found that the statute did not require a showing 
88. !d. at 1500-01. 
89. ld. 
90. /d. at 1506. 
91. United States v. Hayes Int' I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1501 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
92. Id. 
93. 42 u.s.c. § 6928(d)(1). 
94. Hayes Int 'I, 786 F .2d at 1501 n.2. 
95. Id. at 1500. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 1501. 
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that the defendant knew of the regulations. 98 But it did hold that 
the defendant had to know of the "permit status" of the facility to 
which it transported hazardous waste. 99 Thus, according to the 
Eleventh Circuit, to prove a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(l), 
the government must prove that the "defendant knew what the 
waste was (here, a mixture of paint and solvent), and that the 
defendant knew the disposal site had no permit." 100 The 
government did not have to prove that the defendant knew that a 
permit was required. 101 
The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis with the relevant 
legislative history. 102 As developed in more detail below, the 
legislative history is singularly unilluminating. 103 In a joint 
report of both houses, the Conference Committee had little to say 
about the mens rea required under the Act. The Committee 
summed up its views as follows: 
The state of mind for all criminal violations under [the 
Act] is "knowing." The conferees have not sought to 
define "knowing" for offenses under subsection 
[6928](d); that process has been left to the courts under 
general principles." 104 
The conference report disclaimed that it was defining 
knowledge. 105 Technically, the problem before the court in 
Hayes International and Johnson & Towers is not a question of 
definition of the term. Instead, it is a question of, in the words of 
the Supreme Court, how far down the sentence the term 
98. ld. at 1503. 
99. United States v. Hayes Int •I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 
1986). 
100. Id. at 1505. 
101. Id. at 1503. 
102. Id. at 1502. 
103. See discussion infra notes 256-84 and accompanying text. 
104. H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5019, 5038 note to§ 3008(£) (emphasis added). 
105. H.R. Rep. No. 1444, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.CA.N. 5019, 5038. 
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"knowingly" runs. 106 Nonetheless, the best guidance offered by 
the Conference Committee is that uncertainty about the mens rea 
term should be resolved by resort to general principles. 107 
The Eleventh Circuit recognized the difficulty in resorting to 
the relevant Supreme Court precedent. 108 It reviewed a number 
of the leading cases on point and placed reliance on United States 
v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. 109 There, the 
Supreme Court construed a statute which provided that it was an 
offense to "knowingly violat[e] a regulation. "110 According to 
the Eleventh Circuit, International Minerals "held that knowledge 
of the regulation was not an element of the offense; the use of 
"knowingly" in the statute referred only to the defendant's 
knowledge that the materials being shipped were dangerous. "111 
The court was certainly correct that International Minerals was 
relevant to its inquiry. But as developed in more detail below, 112 
International Minerals' precendential value was eroded by the 
more recent decision in Liparota v. United States, 113 a decision 
in which the Supreme Court interpreted similar statutory language 
(making it an offense for a person to "knowingly use .. . [food 
stamps] in any manner not authorized by . the 
regulations, ")114 to require proof that the defendant knew that his 
conduct was unauthorized.m The Eleventh Circuit distinguished 
Liparota on linguistic grounds. It found that 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l) 
made specific reference to "regulations" as an element of the 
106. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-25, n.7 (1985) 
(quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSDN W. SCOTI, JR., CRIMINAL LAW§ 27 
(1st ed. 1972)). 
107. 126 CONG. REC. H3345, 3368 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980). 
108. United States v. Hayes Int' I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502-03 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
109. Id. at 1502 (quoting United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. 
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971). 
110. Int'l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560. 
111. Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1502 (quoting/nt 'I Minerals, 402 U .S. at 
565). 
112. 
113. 
114. 
115. 
See discussion infra note 340-54 and accompanying text. 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
7 u.s.c. 2024 (1992). 
Liparota, 471 U .S. at 419. 
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offense, unlike 42 U.S.C. § 6928 which makes reference to the 
permit requirement but not to "regulations. "116 It also found that, 
unlike 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) is a public 
welfare statute. 117 
The court did find that the government must prove that the 
defendant knew whether the facility had a permit: "the 
congressional purpose indicates knowledge of the permit status is 
required. The precise wrong Congress intended to combat through 
[42 U.S.C. §] 6928(d) was transportation to an unlicensed facility. 
Removing the knowing requirement from this element would 
criminalize innocent COnduct . . . . "118 
At this juncture, Hayes International deviated from the 
approach taken by the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers. The 
Third Circuit specifically required a showing that the defendant 
knew that the company had to have a permit and that, in fact, it 
did not have one. The Eleventh Circuit found only that the 
government had to show that the defendant knew that the company 
to which hazardous waste was transported did not have a permit, 
not that it was required to have one. 119 
The Eleventh Circuit found that criminal liability under 
RCRA did not require knowledge of the regulation because 42 
U.S.C. § 6928(d) is a public welfare statute and, therefore, "it is 
completely fair and reasonable to charge those who choose to 
operate in such areas with knowledge of the regulatory 
provisions. "120 The Eleventh Circuit insisted, however, that the 
government must establish that the defendant knew that the facility 
had no permit. It did so because to hold otherwise would be to 
criminalize innocent conduct. 121 Its example demonstrates one 
instance where innocent conduct might be criminalized: "for 
example, if the defendant reasonably believed that the site had a 
116. 
1986). 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
1986). 
United States v. Hayes Int 'I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 
!d. 
Id. at 1504. 
Id. at 1504-05. 
Id. at 1503. 
United States v. Hayes Int •I Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 
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permit, but in fact had been misled by the people at the site . . . 
11122 
The only way to give coherence to the Eleventh Circuit's 
position (i.e., that the Act must be read to avoid criminalizing 
innocent conduct and so must be read to require that a defendant 
knew that the facility lacked a permit, but that a defendant does 
not have to know that a permit is required)123 is to engage in the 
court's presumption that anyone in the business must be aware of 
the regulations. 124 
In some areas of the law, such a presumption certainly makes 
sense. For example, the common law's traditional resistance to 
recognizing ignorance of the law as a defense may at least in part 
be explained by our unwillingness to believe a suspect's claim that 
he was unaware that theft or robbery was illegal.125 There, an 
irrebuttable presumption arises that the defendant knew the law 
would be logical. It is less clear that such a presumption should 
be, in effect, irrebuttable in the area of environmental law .126 
The Eleventh Circuit did not give examples of whether innocent 
conduct might be criminalized if the government need not prove 
the defendant's knowledge of the permit requirement. But such 
examples are not hard to come by. In light of the broad meaning 
of the term "person, "127 for example, a recently hired truck 
driver with little or no training about industry regulations may 
violate the act by knowingly transporting what he knows to be 
hazardous waste and when asked, he may know that he has not 
inquired whether the facility has a permit. 128 It is doubtful that 
such a person should be presumed to know that a permit is 
required. Hence, under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, it is not 
122. !d. at 1504. 
123. !d. 
124. !d. at 1503 (insisting that its reading of RCRA is consistent with 
fairness, as well as with congressional intent). 
125. See People v. 0 'Brien, 31 P. 45 (Cal. 1892); see also GLANVILLE 
WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART,§ 102 at 291 (2d ed. 1961). 
126. See discussion infra notes 366-90 and accompanying text. 
127. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662,664-65 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 {1985). 
128. Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1504 n.6. 
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hard to conceive of examples in which morally innocent conduct 
might well be criminalized by holding that knowledge of the 
permit requirement is not an essential element of the offense.129 
Both Johnson & Towers and Hayes International underscored 
that the government's burden of proof was hardly insurmountable, 
given the variety of inferences that the jury would be permitted to 
draw based on, for example, the failure to follow certain 
procedures. 130 Proof of knowledge of the requirement of having 
a permit would be subject to similar proof. For example, the jury 
would almost certainly be entitled to infer knowledge of the 
regulation from the fact that a person has a position of 
responsibility in a regulated company. 131 Instead, the position of 
the Eleventh Circuit treats knowledge of the regulation as an 
irrebuttable presumption. 132 Treating it merely as an inference 
would not significantly impair environmental interests because the 
inference would most likely be convincing when the defendant was 
in a position of control. 
C. United States v. Hojlin 
In United States v. Hojlin, 133 Douglas Hoflin, the Director 
of Public Works Department for Ocean Shores in Washington 
state, was convicted on one count of aiding and abetting the 
disposal of hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
129. One reason might be that we can trust prosecutor's discretition 
to avoid bringing charges against non-culpable offenders. See Lambert v. 
California, 355 U.S. 225, 230 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Apart from 
the questionable merit of that argument generally, it seems especially 
questionable in this context because of the political interest in using the 
criminal law to combat environmental degradation. See, e.g., Fromm, supra 
note 18, at 822. Hansen, supra note 18, at 987 n.l.; McMurry, supra note 14, 
at 1140-44; Starr, supra note 14, at 380-81. 
130. Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1504-05 n.8. 
131. Compare with United States v. Int' I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 
u.s. 558, 565 (1971). 
132. Hayes Int 'I, 786 F.2d at 1502-03. 
133. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cerl. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
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6928(d)(2)(A). 134 The charge arose out of his responsibility for 
supervising the community's roads. 
During a seven year period, Ocean Shores purchased 3,500 
gallons of paint for painting roadways. At one point in 1982, 
unused paint was stored indoors in one of the department's 
buildings. The fire marshal ordered that the drums be removed 
and stored outdoors. 135 
The government's proof at trial amply demonstrated that 
Hoflin knew that the liquid was flammable. For example, the 
shipping documents and the drums both indicated that the material 
was flammable. 136 For at least one shipment, Hoflin signed the 
bill of lading which identified the contents as flammable 
liquid.137 
Despite that knowledge, Hoflin ordered the public works yard 
cleaned up and the excess paint buried at the community's sewage 
treatment plant. The director of the plant warned him that to do 
so would be in violation of the law. 138 Hoflin then directed one 
employee to transport the drums to the treatment plant and another 
to bury the drums. 139 
The director of the treatment plant reported the incident to an 
official of the state Department of Ecology, who in turn reported 
it to the EPA. 140 The EPA's investigation uncovered fourteen 
drums buried on the premises, ten of which contained liquid. 
134. Defendant-Appellant's Opening Brief at 1, United States v. 
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
1143 (1990). Hollin was also charged with a felony violation of 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(d)(2)(A) for conspiring with others to dispose of hazardous waste 
without having obtained a permit from the EPA and convicted of a 
misdemeanor for violation of 33 U .S.C. § 1319(c)(1) for aiding and abbeting 
the burial of sludge. 
135. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035 (demonstrating defendant's knowledge 
of flammability) . 
136. Brief for the Appellee at 8, United States v. Hoflin , 880 F.2d 1033 
(9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
137. ld. at 7. 
138. ld. at 9. 
139. ld. 
140. Id. at 6-7 
1993] DOES CULPABILITY MA1TER? 209 
Paint had leaked out of several drums and had penetrated the 
soil.141 
Hoflin admitted that he knew that the diposal of hazardous 
waste was regulated by a permit system under an environmental 
agency. His defense was based on a claim that he did not know 
that the traffic paint, especially the solidified paint, was 
hazardous. 142 
Hoflin appealed his conviction based on the trial court's 
refusal to give his proposed jury instructions on the necessary 
elements of 42 U.S.C. § 6928.143 He submitted the following 
jury instruction: 
To establish the crime charged, the government must prove 
four elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That the defendant knowingly disposed of 
certain material; 
2. That he did so knowing the material was 
"hazardous waste;" 
3. That the defendant acted knowing that the burial 
of these materials required a permit from the 
Environmental Protection Agency; and 
4. That he knew no permit had been obtained.144 
In most details, Hoflin was requesting a jury instruction consistent 
with the holding in Johnson & Towers. 145 
The Ninth Circuit rejected Hoflin's claim. 146 It found that 
the statutory language was unambiguous. 147 It based its 
141. Brief for the Appellee at 10, United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 
1033 (9th Cir. 1989) (No. 86-3071), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
142. ld. at 11. 
143. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
144. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
145. Id. at 1037. The only difference between the instructions 
requested in Hof/in and Johnson & Towers is that Hoflin added a specific 
reference to the EPA. 
146. Id. at 1038. 
147. Id. at 1037. 
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argument on the fact that 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), the offense 
with which Hoflin was charged, contained the term "knowingly" 
in subsection (2}, but not in subsection (A).14s By contrast, 
subsection (2)(B) contains the term "knowing. "149 Thus, if a 
person is charged under 42 U.S.C § 6928(d)(2)(B), the 
government must prove that he knowingly treated a hazardous 
waste (B) in knowing violation of a material condition of a permit. 
A person who "knowingly" treats a hazardous waste is guilty 
under subsection (A) merely if the act is done without having 
obtained a permit. That is, the Ninth Circuit found that neither 
knowledge of the permit requirement or that of the fact that no 
permit had been obtained was an element of the offense. 150 
The Ninth Circuit found that the Act's language did not 
support contrary result. "To read the word 'knowingly' at the 
beginning of section (2) into subsection (A) would be to eviscerate 
this distinction [between subsections (A) and (B)]. Thus, it is 
plain that knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element 
of the offense defined by subsection (A). "151 
The court specifically rejected the Third Circuit's approach 
in Johnson & Towers. 152 It did so largely on its finding that the 
statute was unambiguous: "Had Congress intended knowledge of 
the lack of a permit to be an element under subsection (A) it easily 
could have said so. It specifically inserted a knowledge element 
in subsection (B), and it did so notwithstanding the 'knowingly' 
modifier which introduces subsection (2). "153 Johnson & 
Towers' approach, according to the Ninth Circuit, would make the 
knowing term in (B) surplusage. 154 
Despite its conclusion that the meaning of the language was 
plain, the court also found that its reading of the Act was 
consistent with the underlying purpose of RCRA. It found that the 
148. Id. at 1037. 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B). 
150. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038-39. 
151. ld. at 1037. 
152. Id. at 1038. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
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Act was, in effect, a public welfare measure. tss 
Unlike the Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers, the Ninth 
Circuit found that its interpretation, distinguishing between 
violators charged under subsections (A) and (B), was not illogical. 
It found rational a distinction between handlers of hazardous waste 
who had obtained a permit but who were acting in violation of its 
conditions and those who had not notified the EPA that they were 
handling hazardous waste at all. 1s6 In effect, it found a handler 
of hazardous waste who did not notify the government more 
culpable because the failure to do so makes it that much more 
difficult for the agency to perform its obligation.157 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with Hoflin' s contention that the 
government must prove that "the defendant knew the material 
being disposed of was hazardous. ntss The court found that 
"knowingly" modified not only "treats, stores, or disposes of," but 
also hazardous waste. 159 The charge given by the trial court 
stated that the jury had to find that the defendant "knew the 
chemical waste had the potential to be harmful to others or to the 
environment. "160 Although that charge did not state explicitly 
that the defendant had to know that the substance was hazardous, 
the court found that the instruction conveyed the idea 
sufficiently. 161 
D. United States v. Dee 
In 1990, the Fourth Circuit followed the lead of the Ninth 
Circuit in United States v. Dee.162 There, the government 
charged engineers, civilian employees of the United States Army, 
155. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
156. Id. at 1038-39. 
157. ld. 
158. Id. at 1039. 
159. Id. 
160. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
161. /d. 
162. United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990). 
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with multiple violations under the RCRA. The defendants headed 
departments at the Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland. 163 
That facility had a RCRA permit, but the defendants permitted the 
storage of the hazardous waste in an area not covered by the 
RCRA permit. 164 
The Fourth Circuit did not engage in extensive analysis of the 
statutory construction problem. It rested the decision largely on 
the now familiar citation to International Minerals to the effect that 
"ignorance of the law is no defense, "165 and on the Eleventh 
Circuit's holding in Hayes International and the Ninth Circuit's 
holding in Hojlin. 166 As in Hojlin, the Fourth Circuit held that 
the government has to establish only "knowledge of the general 
hazardous character of the wastes. "167 In Dee, the trial court 
instructed the jury incorrectly that the government had to .prove 
that the defendants knew that the substances were chemicals, not 
that the chemicals were hazardous. The court found the erroneous 
instruction harmless. 168 
E. United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc. 
In 1991, the Fifth Circuit upheld the conv1ct10n of a 
corporate defendant on two counts of improper storage of 
hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) and 
reversed the district court's grant of judgments of acquittal in favor 
of two individual defendants on the two RCRA counts. 169 
Baytank, a bulk liquid chemical storate facility, and the individual 
defendants, an executive vice president and a safety manager, 170 
violated 42 U.S.C. § 6928 by storing hazardous waste at Baytank's 
163. Id. at 743-44. 
164. Id. at 743. 
165. Id. at 745 (citing United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 
402 u.s. 558, 563 (1971)). 
166. Id. 
167. United States v. Dee, 912 F. 2d 741, 745 (1990), cert. denied, 111 
S. Ct. 1307 (1990). 
168. !d. 
169. United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 602 (4th Cir. 1991). 
170. !d. at 603. 
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facility in Seabrook, Texas, a facility without a permit as required 
by RCRA. 
On appeal, Baytank challenged the exclusion of a requested 
instruction that the jury had to find not only that the EPA had 
identified the particular waste as hazardous, but also that the 
defendants knew that fact. 171 Consistent with Hojlin, the lower 
court did instruct that the prosecutor had to prove that the 
defendants knew that the waste was hazardous. 172 In light of that 
instruction, the Fifth Circuit rejected Baytank's claim that an 
innocent person might be convicted of a felony under the 
government's theory of the case. 173 
The Fifth Circuit characterized Baytank's claim as a defense 
of ignorance of law and relied on International Minerals' narrow 
reading of the mens rea requirement in cases involving dangerous 
substances. 174 It also relied on the result reached in other 
circuits to support its conclusion that "knowledge" does not attach 
to the fact that the EPA has classified the substance as 
hazardous. 175 
In relief on Hayes International, the court distinguished 
Liparota. The Fifth Circuit found Baytank' s proposed 
interpretation less readily suggested by 42 U.S.C. § 6928's 
statutory language than the language involved in Liparota. 176 
The Fifth Circuit also relied on the suggestion in dicta in Liparota 
that offenses involving the community's health and safety are 
public welfare offenses, in which case the more begrudging 
statutory analysis in International Minerals controls.177 Finally, 
it declined to follow Johnson & Towers' contrary suggestion that 
knowledge of the regulations is an essential element of a RCRA 
offense. 178 
Thus after eight years of litigation in several federal circuits, 
171. Id. at 612. 
172. /d. 
173. /d. 
174. United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 602 (4th Cir. 1991). 
175. /d., specifically relying on Hoflin, Dee, and Hayes Int '/. 
176. /d. at 613. 
177. /d. 
178. /d. 
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three distinct interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 have emerged. 
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits interpretation, which is the most 
restrictive, requires only that the defendant know that the substance 
is hazardous. 179 The Eleventh Circuit requires no showing of the 
defendant's knowledge that a permit must be secured, but does 
require a showing of defendant's knowledge that no permit has 
been secured.180 The Third Circuit requires the additional 
knowledge of the permit requirement. 181 
IV. THE APPROPRIATE STEPS TO CONSTRUE A STATUTE 
All of the courts that have considered the construction of 42 
U.S.C. § 6928 have implicitly agreed on the appropriate steps of 
the court's inquiry!82 The starting point is the language of the 
Act. If it is found unambiguous, the court should have no 
recourse to legislative history. 183 If the language is ambiguous, 
then the court may have recourse to the legislative history .184 If 
the history is inconclusive, the court should look to background 
assumptions governing the criminal law. 185 Absent evidence to 
the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that Congress would act 
179. See United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (1990), cert. denied, 
111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990); United States v. Hoflin 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th 
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
180. United States v. Hayes Int' 1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504-05 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
181. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3rd 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
182. See discussion supra notes 54-179 and accompanying text. 
183. See Carninetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917) (holding 
that defendant's act of transporting a willing girl to another state for the 
purpose of having sexual relations violated the plain meaning of the Mann 
Act, and therefore was not subject to any alternative interpretation by the 
Court); see also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION 
OF STA1UI'ES, 229-33 (1975); SINGER, NORMAN, 2A Sl!THERIAND 
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed., 1992). 
184. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,424-25 (1985) (researching 
the legislative history after finding the statute in question to be ambiguous). 
185. See id. at 427 (applying the doctrine of lenity after finding the 
congressional purpose unclear). 
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consistently with those background assumptions. 186 
Consistency ends with the general agreement of the relevant 
steps of inquiry. Thereafter, the various circuits interpreting 42 
U.S.C. § 6928 agree upon little. 
A. Is 42 U.S.C § 6928 Unambiguous? 
1. The meaning of "person" 
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) creates two offenses. Subsection (A) 
makes it an offense if "[a]ny person ... knowingly treats, stores, 
or disposes of any [specific] hazardous waste . .. without [having 
obtained] a permit." 187 Subsection (B) makes it an offense if 
"any person ... knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any 
[specified] hazardous waste . . . in knowing violation of any 
material condition or requirement of such permit. "188 Most of 
the litigation addressing these sections has focused on whether 
"knowingly" attaches to different elements of the offense, 
specifically whether it attaches to the fact that the waste was 
hazardous and to the fact that a permit is required. Since Johnson 
&: Towers, the meaning of "person" has received little 
attention. 189 But in assessing the literal or unambiguous meaning 
of 42 U.S.C. § 6928, Johnson &: Towers miscontrued the term 
"person," leading to some of the uncertainty about the meaning of 
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). 
186. See id.; see also United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chern. Corp., 
402 u.s. 558, 563 (1971). 
187. 42 U.S.C. § 6928( d)(2)(A). 
188. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B). 
189. The meaning of "person" was raised in United States v. Dee, 912 
F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir. 1990). The court held that federal employees were 
"persons" and that sovereign immunity does not apply to individual 
government employees so as to immunize them from prosecutions from their 
criminal acts, id. at 744. Other defendants prosecuted under 42 U.S.C. § 6928 
have not raised this issue. See also United States v. Sellers, 926 F. 2d 410 (5th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int' 1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
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As discussed above, 190 the Third Circuit reversed the 
district court's order dismissing the indictment in Johnson &: 
Towers. The district court found that "person" in 42 U.S.C. § 
6928 applied only to "owners and operators" of a facility. 191 
Instead, the Third Circuit gave a literal interpretation to the term 
"person," i.e., that it applied to any person, including employees. 
In addition to the plain meaning of the Act, the Third Circuit also 
found that its reading of the term "person" would further the 
regulatory goals of the Act. 192 
While an employee is obviously a "person" within the literal 
meaning of that term, the Third Circuit ignored the context in 
which the term "person" is used in 42 U.S.C. § 6928. Johnson&: 
Towers dealt with employees charged under subsection (2)(A); 
specifically, the employees were charged with knowingly treating, 
storing, or disposing of hazardous waste "without having obtained 
a permit" under relevant provisions of federal law. 193 Apart 
from whether "knowingly" attaches to the permit requirement, 194 
a close reading of subsection (2)(A) denotes that a violator under 
this subsection is one who had a duty to obtain a permit. The 
complex nonfinite verb phrase "having obtained" requires a 
subject, a person who must do the obtaining. This follows from 
a fundamental rule of grammar that every verb must have a 
subject. The subject literally would appear to be the person who 
knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of the hazardous waste --
there is no other person or grammatically possible agent of the 
action mentioned who could violate subsection (2)(A) other than 
the one who was supposed to obtain the permit but failed to do so. 
Elsewhere in the Act, Congress specified that owners and 
operators are the people responsible for obtaining the permit. 195 
Thus, paraphrased, the plain meaning of subsection (A) would 
appear to be as follows: A person, who is obligated to obtain a 
190. See discussion supra notes 57-83 and accompanying text. 
191. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664 (3rd 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) . 
192. !d. at 666. 
193. !d. at 664. 
194. !d. at 665. 
195. 42 u.s.c. § 6925 (1992). 
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permit, specifically an owner/operator, who fails to do so, is guilty 
of an offense if he treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous 
waste. 
The government's argument in Johnson & Towers that 
subsection (d) applies to any person who treats, stores, or diposes 
of hazardous waste ignores subsection (A)'s requirement that the 
person must be one who had a duty to obtain a permit. 196 The 
government's position found support in a statement in the 
legislative history. In the House Committee's discussion of the 
Act, it states that "[t]his section also provides for criminal 
penalties for the person who . . . disposes of any hazardous waste 
without a permit under this title. "197 That is not the language 
used by Congress; that interpretation ignores the phrase "without 
having obtained" and would leave "having obtained" without a 
subject. 
Contrary to the assertion in Johnson & Towers, 198 a 
syntactically correct reading of the Act would not have undercut 
RCRA's enforcement goals. The term "person" would not be 
similarly limited in subsection (d)(2)(B) of the Act. That 
provision, properly read, would apply to any person who 
knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of hazardous waste in 
knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such 
permit. Subsection (B) would appear to apply to those employees 
in a position to implement the requirements of the permit. 
That reading of the Act is syntactically correct. At first 
blush, it creates an anomalous result. Subsection (A) would 
criminalize only operators and owners who failed to get a permit, 
not their employees. By contrast, once an employer obtained a 
permit, the Act would criminalize any employee who knowingly 
violated the permit.199 
The result is in fact not anomalous. Consider the reality of 
the workplace. Employees are neither required to obtain the permit 
196. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 665. 
197. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238,6269. 
198. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 667. 
199. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F. 2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 
1989}, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990} (finding that result anomalous). 
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nor, presumably, empowered to do so by the law. It seems 
draconian to impose criminal liability on an employee for 
continuing to perform the job for which he has been hired when he 
is powerless to change those conditions. That is especially 
draconian if, as insisted by the Ninth Circuit, he may be found 
guilty without even a showing that he knew that there was a permit 
requirement. 200 
Once the permit is obtained, employees have a defense if 
they did not know of the permit's material conditions.201 Their 
criminal liability is only for knowing violations. That liability is 
hardly draconian; it must be based on a showing of a knowing 
violation of a material condition or requirement of the permit. 
Limiting 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) liability to those charged 
with the responsibility of procuring the permit keeps the criminal 
sanctions within rational limits based on culpable conduct. This 
is especially true if subsection (d)(2)(A) is read not to require 
knowledge of the permit requirement. In that context, any number 
of employees may transport, store, or dispose of hazardous waste 
for a company that has not secured a permit. Many of them may 
lack knowledge that there is a permit requirement or that the 
company is obligated to have one; further, they may be in no 
position to influence the employer's decision to violate the law. 
2. The scope of "knowingly" 
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) provides that a person commits 
an offense if he knowingly treats, stores or disposes of any 
hazardous waste without having obtained a permit. 202 As often 
has been the case with federal statutes, courts have to decide 
200. /d. at 1037; see also Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65. While 
the lower court treated employees as mere accomplices, holding that they 
could be charged as aiders and abettors under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) without 
any mention of a mens rea requirment, the appellate court allowed 
prosecution of employees as principal offenders under 42 U.S.C. § 6928, but 
added the requirement that criminal prosecution is available only if they knew 
or should have known that there had been no compliance with the permit 
requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 6925. 
201. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B). 
202. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). 
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among competing interpretations of the same language. 
Specifically, the "knowingly" term may attach to a number of 
different material elements. 
42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) allows four interpretations. First, 
"knowingly" may only attach to "treats, stores, or disposes." One 
would be guilty of an offense if the prosecutor demonstrated only 
that the actor knew that she was treating, storing, or disposing of 
a substance and that the substance was hazardous and that no 
permit had been obtained. Second, "knowingly" may attach to 
the verbs and in addition may attach to the hazardous nature of the 
substance. That is, a person would be guilty of an offense if the 
prosecutor demonstrated not only knowledge that one was, for 
example, disposing of a substance, but also knew that the 
substance was hazardous. If that were the correct reading of the 
Act, it would be necessary to demonstrate that no permit was 
obtained. But the prosecutor would not have to show that the 
offender knew that the permit had not been obtained or that there 
was a permit requirement. 
Third, "knowingly" may attach to the verbs, to the fact that 
the substance was hazardous, and to the fact that no permit was 
obtained, but not to the requirement that a permit be obtained. 
Fourth, "knowingly" may attach to all of the elements, including 
the permit requirement. In such a case, the prosecutor would have 
to demonstrate that the defendant knew that he was, for example, 
storing what he knew was hazardous waste and that he knew that 
a permit was required and that no permit had been acquired. 
No court to date has adopted the first interpretation, although 
that was the position argued by the government in Johnson & 
Towers.203 The Ninth Circuit adopted the second position;204 
the Eleventh Circuit in the related context of 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(d)(1), in effect, adopted the third approach.205 The Third 
Circuit adopted the fourth position. 206 That suggests that the 
203. Johnson & Towers, 741 F. 2d at 668 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied 
sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
204. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039. 
205. United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
206. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 664-65. 
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language is ambiguous. Despite that fact, the Ninth Circuit found 
the language to be unambiguous. 
Initially, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion concerning the scope 
of the term "knowingly" is supported by traditional rules of 
grammar. A grammarian would describe the appropriate 
construction of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) as follows: "knowingly" 
would be a predication adjunct; as such, it would modify all of the 
requisite features of the predication.207 Because "treat," "store," 
and "disposes of' are all transitive verbs (i.e., verbs requiring a 
direct object), the direct object, "waste," is a requisite feature of 
the predication. 208 Additionally, because "hazardous" restricts 
the meaning of "waste," "hazardous" is also a requisite 
feature. 209 Hence, all of these terms must fall within the scope 
of "knowingly." 
That is not the case with subclauses (A) and (B). They 
would be sentence adjuncts insofar as they modify the entire 
independent clause, "Any person .. . waste." They, therefore, do 
not fall within the scope of the adverb in that clause, 
"knowingly. "210 
What the Ninth Circuit's approach ignores is that the 
Supreme Court has not adopted the rules of grammar as the 
controlling rules for statutory construction. In a number of 
instances, the Supreme Court has addressed grammatical 
constructions parallel to that in 42 U.S.C. § 6928 and come to 
inconsistent results concerning the scope of the "knowingly" term. 
In Morissette v. United States,211 the defendant was accused 
of violating 18 U.S. C. § 641 , providing in relevant part that 
"[w]hoever ... knowingly converts to his use . . . anything of 
value of the United States . . . "212 is guilty of a crime. In 
207. See, e.g., RANDOLF QUIRK ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE GRAMMAR 
OF THE ENGLISH lANGUAGE § 8.25, at 504-10 (1985). I am especially 
appreciative of Dr. Robert Chaim' s help with the analysis of this point. 
208. Id. at 508-10. 
209. Id. at 508. 
210. Id. at 511. 
211. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248 (1952). 
212. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1951) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1992)). 
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United States v. International Miner:als, 213 the Court must 
determine the elements to which "knowingly" attached in 18 
U.S.C. § 834, making it an offense for a person to "knowingly 
violate any ... regulation" formulated by the Interstate Commerce 
Commission. 214 In United States v. Yermian, 215 the Court had 
to decide whether the government had to prove that the defendant 
knew that the matter was within the jurisdiction of a federal 
agency to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which 
provides that "[w]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of 
any department or agency of the United States knowingly and 
willfully ... makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements. 
• • "
216 shall be guilty of an offense. And more recently, the 
Supreme Court interpreted similar language in Liparota v. United 
States, 217 where it had to interpret the following language: 
"Whoever knowingly uses, tranfers, acquires, alters, or posesses 
coupons ... in any manner not authorized by [the statute] or the 
regulations"218 shall be guilty of a criminal offense. 
The language in each of the cited provisions is parallel. In 
each, the mens rea term, "knowingly," is placed near the 
beginning of the sentence. 
If the rules of grammar were controlling, in the case of 18 
U.S.C. § 641, for example, the government would have to prove 
that a defendant knew he was converting something of value, that 
it had value, and that it was the property of the United States. 
That would be the case because "knowingly," a predication 
adjunct, would modify the transitive verb "converts" and its direct 
object, "anything of value of the United States. "219 
In the case of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the government would have 
to prove that a matter was within the jurisdiction of a Department 
or Agency of the United States, but not have to prove that the 
213. 
(1971). 
214. 
215. 
216. 
217. 
218. 
219. 
United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 560 
18 U.S.C. § 834 (1971) (repealed 1979). 
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984). 
ld. at 68 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1992)). 
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
7 u.s.c. § 2024(b)(1) (1985). 
See QUIRK, supra note 207, at 509-10. 
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defendant knew that it was. Instead, it would have to prove only 
that he was making a statement and that the statement was false. 
"[I]n any matter within the jurisdiction of any department . . 
• "
220 is a sentence adjunct221 and would not be within the scope 
of the mens rea terms, "knowingly and willfully." 
By contrast, the rules of grammar would require the 
government to prove not only a knowing act, but knowledge of the 
regulations in 18 U.S.C. § 834. That is so because, as 
demonstrated above, the adverb "knowingly" includes within its 
scope the direct object of the transitive verb.222 In 18 U.S. C. § 
834, "violates" is a transitive verb and "any regulation" is its 
direct object. 223 
Finally, in the case of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l), the 
government would have to prove that the offender knowingly 
transferred or acquired or posessed what he knew to be coupons. 
That is so because "coupons" is the direct object of the transitive 
verbs, hence within the scope of "knowingly." But "in any 
manner not authorized by [the statute] or the regulations" would be 
a sentence adjunct and not within the scope of the adverb. 224 
Even a cursory review of what the Supreme Court actually 
held in the relevant cases demonstrates that the Court has not tied 
statutory construction to the rules of grammar. Yennian was 
decided consistently with the rules of grammar. There, the Court 
held that the government did not have to prove that the defendant 
knew that the matter was within the jurisdiction of a federal 
agency.225 Although the Court's analysis was consistent with 
traditional grammatical rules, the Congress, at least according to 
the dissent's reading of congressional history, did not intend the 
traditional rules to apply. 226 
Other than in Yennian, however, the Court's holdings were 
not consistent with the results based on a close grammatical 
220. 18 u.s.c. § 1001 (1992). 
221. See QUIRK, supra note 207, at 511-12. 
222. /d. at 508-10. 
223. !d. 
224. !d. at 508-14. 
225. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68-70 (1984). 
226. !d. at 76-77 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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reading of the statute. In Morissette, the Court did hold that the 
govenment had to prove that the defendant knew that the property 
was that of another.227 But there is no indication in the Court's 
decision that it would have to prove that an accused knew that the 
property was the property of the United States. Unlike legal, as 
opposed to grammatical analysis, that the property belonged to the 
United States would almost certainly be jurisdictional,228 not a 
material element to which a mens rea term would attach. 
International Minerals and Liparota provide a perfect 
contrast to the Court's statutory construction and the rules of 
grammar. Whereas rules of grammar would place the regulations 
within the scope of "knowingly" in International Minerals, the 
Court held that the government had to show only that the 
defendant knew the nature of the thing shipped. 229 By contrast, 
in Liparota, the Court held that the government had to prove that 
the defendant knew that he was violating the regulations. 230 
Application of the rules of grammar would have produced a 
contrary result. 231 
While the Ninth Circuit's construction of 42 U.S.C. § 6928 
is consistent with rules of grammar, it is hard to argue that the 
language of the Act is not ambiguous. Unless courts simply do 
not understand the rules of grammar, the inconsistent construction 
given similar syntax demonstrates that the syntax can support 
different interpretations. The American Law Institute explicitly 
identified the ambiguity in criminal statutes and drafted Model 
Penal Code § 2.02(4) to deal with that question.232 Specifically, 
the drafters commented that "[s]ubsection [2.02](4) is addressed to 
a pervasive ambiguity in definitions of offenses that include a 
culpability requirement, namely, that it is often difficult to 
determine how many of the elements of the offense the 
227. 
228. 
229. 
64 (1971). 
230. 
231. 
232. 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U .S. 246, 270 (1952). 
See United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 676 (1975). 
United States v. Int' I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558,563-
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 434 (1985). 
See discussion supra notes 219-21 and accompanying text. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02( 4) (Prop. Off. Draft 1962). 
224 TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6 
requirement is meant to modify. "233 
The Model Penal Code solution rejects the rules of grammar. 
Instead, "[s]ubsection (4) provides that if the definition is not 
explicit on the point, as by prescribing different kinds of 
culpability for different elements, the culpability statement will 
apply to all the elements, unless a contrary purpose plainly 
appears. "234 Given the specialized use of language in the law, 
especially in the criminal law, statutory construction can 
appropriately abandon ordinary rules of grammar when those rules 
would produce results inconsistent with the underlying premises of 
the criminal law. 235 
The Ninth Circuit found additional textual support for its 
view that 42 U.S.C. § 6928 was unambiguous in subsections (A) 
and (B). The Ninth Circuit argued that the inclusion of the mens 
rea term in subsection (B) demonstrated that Congress could easily 
have included a knowledge element in (A) and that its failure to 
do so clearly evidenced its intent that knowledge did not attach to 
the permit requirement. 236 That argument is plausible. But the 
233. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary at 228 (1985). See also 
id. at 245. The draftsmen of the Wisconsin Legislature posed the problem in 
these terms: "When, for example, a statute says that it is unlawful to 'willfully, 
maliciously, or wantonly destroy, remove, throw down or injure any [property] 
upon the land of another,' do the words denoting the requirement of intent 
apply only to the doing of the damage or do they also modify the phrase 
• upon the land of another, ' thus requiring knowledge or belief that the 
property is located upon land that belongs to another?" 
234. !d. at 228. Analyzed under 2.02( 4), Yennian, Morissette, and 
Liparota would be correctly decided. In Yennian, placement of the phrase "in 
any matter ... would indicate a clear intent not to attach the mens rea term 
to that provision." In Morissette, "knowingly'' would attach to the status of the 
property, but not to the ownership by the United States. Presumably under 
§ 1.13(10), the role of the U.S. is jurisdictional. As developed below, in 
Liparota, Justice Brennan was influenced by the Model Penal Code. 
235. For example, criminal statutes are usually strictly construed to 
assure the actor with fair warning what conduct is punishable. See, e.g., United 
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); State v. Stockton, 647 P.2d 21, 24 
(Wash. 1982); DICKERSON, supra note 183, at 209. 
236. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
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court insisted that rendered the statute unambiguous. 237 In part, 
it did so because it found meaningful the two categories of 
defendants created by its reading of the statute. It found a 
distinction that the legislature would rationally have intended, 
therefore, not rendering the statute arbitrary or irrational. 238 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the two categories found in 42 
U.S.C. § 6928(d) by reference to the general goals of the Act. 
The Court identified those goals as preventing "the grave danger 
to people and the environment from hazardous wastes. "239 The 
millions of tons of waste represent a significant threat to human 
welfare, but much of the waste is "generated and buried without 
notice until the damage becomes evident. "240 Thus, one of the 
major goals of the legislation is tracking the hazardous waste from 
creation through disposal. Defendants under (B) are those who 
have secured a permit and violate its conditions. They have 
lessened the EPA's burden by notifying the agency, making the 
monitoring of the hazardous waste easier. Defendants under (A) 
are those who have hidden their activity from the EPA, making the 
Agency's task of monitoring hazardous waste more difficult. 241 
That knowledge is required in subsection (B) is hardly 
surprising. Without requiring knowledge (or some mens rea) that 
the person is treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste 
inconsistent with a permit would criminalize a good deal of 
innocent behavior. For example, a person who knows that he is 
disposing of what he knows to be hazardous waste, but does so in 
the good faith reasonable belief that he is doing so consistent with 
the conditions of the permit is hardly blameworthy. The 
underlying conduct is not mala in se. After all, the government 
237. Id. 
238. Id. at 1038. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). There is an element of circularity in the 
Ninth Circuit ' s argument. It is supporting its assertion that the act is 
unambiguous by reference to what Congress might have intended. But if the 
language is unambiguous, intent becomes irrelevant. Ironically, there is 
evidence that Congress had no such disitinction in mind. See discussion infra 
notes 272-73 and accompanying text. 
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has not outlawed disposing or treating or storing hazardous waste. 
It has merely controlled them by a permit system. 242 
What is open to question is whether the same might not be 
said about a violator under subsection (A). For example, one can 
conceive of any number of people who treat, store, or dispose of 
what they know to be hazardous waste without knowing of a 
permit requirement. What about the various employees of the 
Public Works Department who had responsibility for disposing of 
the paint drums in Hojlin?243 Or what about a defendant who in 
fact safely stores hazardous waste but simply is unaware of the 
permit requirement? Treating, storing, and disposing of hazardous 
waste is not necessarily criminal activity. 244 The creation of 
hazardous waste has gone on for years and the handling of 
hazardous waste has sometimes created harm, but not always.245 
That is, the underlying conduct is not necessarily criminal. Under 
the Ninth Circuit's interpretation, those offenders come within the 
terms of the statute, but their failure to know that there is a permit 
requirement hardly makes their conduct culpable. 
The pivotal premise to the Ninth Circuit's position was the 
view shared at times by the Supreme Court that "[w]here . . . 
dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste 
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that 
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing 
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. "246 
That presumption seems rational and would certainly be a 
242. 42 u.s.c. § 6925. 
243. See, e.g., Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1035. 
244. 42 U.S.C. § 6925 establishes a permit system; it does not outlaw 
the underlying conduct. 
245. See PAUL N. CHEREMISINOFF & FRED ELLERBUSCH, RESOURCE 
CONSERVATION & RECOVERY Acr, A SPECIAL REPORT 2 (1979) (providing 
a history of solid waste legislation efforts since 1899); see also EDWARD H. 
RABIN & MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ, THE POLLUTION CRISIS: OFFICIAL 
DocuMENTS 6-7 (1972) (giving an example of how some pollutants will 
eventually decompose and diffuse throughout the environment, while others 
which resist decomposition may be toxic and pose serious health dangers). 
246. Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1038 (quoting United States v. Int' I Minerals 
& Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 565 (1971)). 
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permissible inference for the jury to draw in many cases. 247 
People in management positions might well be expected to know 
that handling of hazardous waste is regulated. 248 But there are 
situations in which that presumption is questionable. 249 At a 
minimum, it suggests that there is no clear break between 
defendants whose conduct is within (A) as opposed to (B). 
At this point, the Ninth Circuit was addressing whether the 
statute, creating two categories of defendants, is unambiguous. 
Congress may have wanted to distinguish along the line suggested 
by the Ninth Circuit. But it is also possible that Congress's lack 
of parallel syntax in (A) and (B) was the result of legislative 
oversight. 
Neither the Third nor Ninth Circuit looked to the other 
provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a), governing imposition of 
civil penalties, which presents an interesting contrast to subsection 
(d). Specificially, under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(l), the 
Administrator may file a civil action against an offender. 250 
Initially, the appropriate relief is injunctive. Under 42 U.S.C. § 
6928(a)(3), if the offender fails to take corrective action, the court 
may impose a civil penalty. 251 
In interpreting the criminal provision within the same section 
247. The problem with the Ninth Circuit's analysis is that it presumes 
knowledge irrebuttably, rather than allowing a jury to make an inference. See 
also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 {1979) (finding conclusive 
preumption of intent unconstitutional). 
248. See Hof/in, 880 F.2d at 1037 (relying on United Stales v. Johnson 
& Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. 
Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 {1985)); see also United States v. Park, 
421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975) {holding that the "[g]overnment establishes a 
prima facie case when it introduces evidence sufficient to warrant a finding by 
the trier of facts that the defendant had, by reason of his position in the 
corporation, responsibility and authority either to prevent in the first instance, 
or prompting to correct the violation complained of, and that he failed to do 
so."); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284-85 {1943). 
249. See discussion infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. 
250. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1). 
251. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (requiring violators who fail to take 
corrective action within time specified by order referred to in (a)(l) and 
(a)(2) to pay a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 for each day of 
continued non-compliance). 
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of RCRA, a court might compare the treatment of a defendant in 
a civil proceeding and in a criminal proceeding. 252 Under 42 
U.S.C. § 6928(a), before the court could impose a civil penalty, 
the offender would have been put on notice of the violation in the 
civil action for injunctive relief. Only upon noncompliance would 
a civil penalty be imposed. 253 Hence, the offender would have 
been given specific notice of his violation, presumably including 
the fact that he was storing hazardous waste in violation of the 
requirement that a permit be acquired. It is anomolous to believe 
that a person may be a criminal offender, now a felon after the 
1980 amendments,254 on a lesser showing than would be required 
to impose civil liability. 
Ordinarily, in considering whether to impose strict liability, 
legislatures and courts construing legislation consider the degree 
of difficulty that a prosecutor may face in proving mens rea.255 
For example, a leading criminal law treatise states that legislatures 
often create criminal liability without fault "to help the prosecution 
cope with a situation wherein [a mens rea] is hard to prove, 
making convictions difficult to obtain unless the fault element is 
omitted. The legislature may think it important to stamp out the 
harmful conduct in question at all costs, even at the cost of 
convicting innocent-minded and blameless people. "256 
Lowering the prosecutor's burden in a prosecution under 42 
252. See Kimes v. Bechtold, 342 S.E.2d 147, 150 (W. Va.1986) (quoting 
syllabus point 3 of Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 
219 S.E. 2d 361 (W. Va. 1975) illustrating in pari materia rule of statutory 
construction whereby statutes which relate to same subject matter should be 
read and applied together so that legislature' s intention can be gathered from 
the whole of enactments. But see Manchin v. Dunfee, 327 S.E.2d 710, 713-14 
(W. Va. 1984) which limits in pari materia to ambiguous statutes only). 
253. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a). 
254. See, e.g., United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(upholding defendant's sentence of sixteen concurrent 41 month sentences, 
based on U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(B) and§ 2Q1.2(b)(4)). 
255. See, e.g., State v. Dobry, 250 N.W. 702, 705 (Iowa 1933); 
Commonwealth v. Mixer, 93 N.E. 249, 249-50 (Mass. 1910); State v. Prince, 
189 P.2d 993,995 (N.M. 1948); see also discussion in LAFAVE, supra note 106, 
at 242-43. 
256. See LAFAVE, supra note 106, at 243. 
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U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) seems hardly necessary. The government 
cannot seriously urge that the reading of "knowingly" as extending 
to that subsection would impose an impossible or unreasonably 
difficult burden on it. 257 It cannot seek the lesser sanction of 
civil penalties until it has given notice to the offender that his 
conduct violates a court order. 
B. What Did Congress Intend? 
On the finding that the statutory language is ambiguous, a 
court is to turn to the legislative history. 258 The legislative 
history surrounding passage of RCRA' s criminal provisions is 
sprase and unilluminating. 259 The House Report contains slightly 
over a page of text discussing enforcement of RCRA' s 
provisions, 260 and says little that bears on the mens rea question. 
First, it observes that the Act provides for a wide array of 
enforcement mechanisms "so that punishment is related to the 
offense. "261 Second, it states that "[m]any times civil penalties 
are more appropriate and more effective than criminal. "262 It 
257. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990) (reaffirming the district court's jury 
instruction which requires that defendant "knew" that the chemical wastes had 
the potential to be harmful to others); see also United States V. Dee, 912 F.2d 
741,743-44 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1307 (1990). But see id. at 
1038 (quoting United States v. Int' I Mineral & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 
565 (1971): "Where . .. dangerous or deleterious devices or products or 
obnoxious waste materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so 
great that anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing 
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation."). 
258. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425 (1985) (Supreme 
Court interpretation of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1), limited to the absence of 
contrary purpose in the language or legislative history of the statute); United 
States v. Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 908-09 (7th Cir. 1982); see also State 
v. Hooper, 386 N.E.2d 1348, 1349 (Ohio 1979). 
259. See United States v. Hayes lot' 1 Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th 
Cir. 1986). 
260. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 9411-1 CONG., 2ND SESS. 30, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238,6268-69. 
261. ld. at 6268. 
262. Id. 
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does not specify when that might be the case. It does suggest that 
the use of criminal sanctions is most appropriate "when there is a 
willful violation of a statute which seriously harms human health 
n263 
After discussing the requirement that the Administrator give 
notice of the nature of the violation and an opportunity to correct 
the violation, the report returns to the use of criminal sanctions. 
But the report largely tracks the statutory language, hardly 
illuminating how the mens rea term should be read: "The use of 
criminal penalties are sufficiently narrow in that they only apply 
to those who knowingly transport hazardous waste to a facility 
which does not have a permit, the actual disposal of hazardous 
wastes without a permit, or the falsification of documents, an of 
which are more serious offenses than the other provisions of the 
hazardous waste title. "264 
The House Report is hardly conclusive on the proper reading 
of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A). But it does offer some support for 
requiring that the mens rea attach to the permit requirement. It 
emphasizes that the use of criminal sanctions would be appropriate 
only in narrow circumstances. 265 Further, even though violations 
of the Act were then characterized as misdemeanors, the report 
underscores that Congress was concerned with principles of 
proportionality, that the punishment should relate to the 
offense. 266 In true public welfare statutes, the traditional 
explanation has been that especially in light of the lesser penalties 
that attach, the governmental interest in enforcement outweighs the 
concern that someone otherwise blameless might be charged with 
an offense. 267 The overriding need for deterrence and efficient 
law enforcement compels abandoning notions of culpability and 
263. !d. (emphasis added). 
264. Id. at 6269. 
265. H .R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238, 6269. 
266. ld. at 6268. 
267. See State v. Collova, 255 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Wis. 1977) ("The usual 
rationale for strict liability statutes is that the public interest is so great that 
as to warrant the imposition of an absolute standard of care."). 
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proportionality. 268 Here, Congress was not willing to abandon 
the fault principle. Indeed, as with other modem enforcement 
schemes, the government has a wide array of sanctions. 269 The 
report demonstrates that enforcement goals did not have to be 
sacrificied despite the limited use of criminal sanctions. Further, 
the report demonstrates that even offenders subject to civil 
penalties would have notice of their violations and an opportunity 
to correct them. Thus, civil sanctions were not appropriate 
without first giving the offender notice of the requirements of the 
law. 270 Whatever might be said generally about the burden of 
imposing a requirement that the government prove the defendant's 
knowledge of the law, that would not appear to be a significant 
obstacle in RCRA cases, at least where the government chose the 
lesser sanction of civil penalties. 271 
When Congress chose to increase the criminal sanctions and 
to make violations of subsection (d) felonies, it again offerred little 
guidance on the mens rea question.272 But as with the 1976 
report, some inferences might be made from the 1980 report. 
The original thirty day notice period was eliminated "to 
authorize the Administrator to act against violations before a 
30-day period has elapsed. This provision is aimed at stopping 
so-called 'midnight dumping' which may not continue at any 
location for more than 30 days, and to seek penalties for single 
268. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE 
L.J. 273,285-86 (1968) (summarizing BARBARA WOOTION, CRIME AND THE 
CRIMINAL LAw (1966)); see also Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73, 84 (1933) (supporting conviction for criminal 
syndicalism or sedition cases in absence of intent by analogizing to public 
welfare offenses). But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U .S. 277, 303 (1983) 
(preserving notions of proportionality in criminal sentencing). 
269. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th CONG., 2nd Sess. 30, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238,6269. 
270. !d. at 6268-69. 
271. But see United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990). 
272. H .R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5038. 
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occurrences, rather than just continuing offenses. "273 
The Joint Conference Report did contain an important 
discussion about 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(B).274 The original act 
did not contain that provision. Instead, it provided that: 
Any person who knowingly --
(1) transports any hazardous waste listed under 
this subtitle to a facility which does not have 
a permit ... 
(2) disposes of any hazardous waste listed under 
this subtitle without having obtained a 
permit therefor . . . 
shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine 
of not more than $25,000 for each day of 
violation, or to imprisonment not to exceed 
one year, or both. 275 
The 1980 amendments were intended, in part, to clarify the law. 
As stated by the conference report, "[t]he proposed section as 
amended would eliminate the ambiguity by providing explicit 
penalties for knowingly failing to comply with a material condition 
of the permit. "276 
The legislative history on this point appears to conflict with 
the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the difference between 
subsections (A) and (B). The Ninth Circuit found that it was 
rational to treat two classes of offenders differently, those who 
notified the EPA of their activities and those who did not. 277 
The legislative history does not suggest that Congress had that 
273. S.R. REP. No. 172, 96th CoNG., 2nd Sess. 4, repn'nted in 1980 
U.S.C.CA.N. 5019,5022. 
274. H .R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 39, repn'nted in 1980 
U.S.C.CA.N. 5028,5037. 
275. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 
94-580, § 3008, 90 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 
(1992)). 
276. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 36-37, repn'nted in 
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5028,5036. 
277. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
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distinction in mind. Instead, it intended to clarify an area of 
uncertainty by making explicit that those who obtain a permit may 
in fact be prosecuted. 278 
The only other relevant discussion of mens rea is that of the 
Eleventh Circuit in Hayes International: "Congress did not 
provide any guidance . . . concerning the meaning of 'knowing' 
in Section 6928(d). !need, Congress stated that it had not sought 
to define 'knowing' for offenses under subsection (d); that process 
has been left to the courts under general principles. "279 By 
contrast, because Congress was enacting a new crime in subsection 
(e), knowing endangerment, it did specifically define knowledge 
for purposes of that subsection.280 It did so by borrowing the 
definition of knowledge from the proposed Criminal Code Reform 
Act, S. 1722,281 a definition which largely tracks the Model 
Penal Code definition of knowledge.282 
It is unclear in context whether the conferees meant to 
address the issue before the courts in Johnson & Towers and 
Hojlin, that is, how far down the sentence the mens rea term 
should run. The meaning of knowledge is hardly settled, despite 
its clearly stated meaning in the Model Penal Code. 283 The 
reference in the conference report suggests that under subsection 
(e), the courts should require actual subjective awareness of a risk 
278. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 36-37, reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5036. 
279. United States v. Hayes Int '1 Corp., 786 F. 2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir. 
1986) (quoting S. Rep. No. 173, 96th CONG., 2ND SESS. 39, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5038). 
280. Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-482, 94 Stat. 23341 § 13(f) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928 
(1992)). 
281. S. 1722, 96th CONG., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (never enacted) ("A 
person • s state of mind is knowing with respect to (1) his conduct if he is 
aware of the nature of his conduct; (2) an existing circumstance if he is aware 
or believes that the circumstances exist; (3) a result of his conduct if he is 
aware or believes that his conduct is substantially certain to cause the result."). 
282. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
283. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.02(2)(B) (Proposed Official Draft 
1962). 
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in defining "knowledge. "284 Hence, by implication, all it meant 
by its statement that the definition of "knowing" would be left to 
the courts under general principles was that courts would have to 
decide whether knowledge could be established based on a 
reasonable person standard. 285 
Neither in 1976 nor in 1980 did Congress clearly grasp the 
issue that has divided the circuit courts. At best, it offers some 
general guidance. It recognized the principle of proportionality 
and culpability, usually not relevant if the statute creates a public 
welfare offense. 286 Hence, in construing the Act, the court ought 
to inquire whether the underlying conduct (without knowledge of 
the permit requirement) would be blameworthy. Further, given 
the wide array of enforcement devices, Congress recognized that 
enforcement would not turn only on the availability of criminal 
sanctions, reducing the risk that liberally construing the knowledge 
requirement would impair effective enforcement goals and public 
safety. Beyond that, the congressional history provides no 
smoking gun. 
C. Background Assumptions of the Criminal Law 
If statutory language and legislative history are inconclusive, 
the Supreme Court has looked to "background assumption[s] of our 
criminal law" 287 to interpret the relevant statutory provision. To 
284. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th CONG., 2nd Sess. 39, reprinted in 1980 
U.S.C.CA.N. 5028, 5038. 
285. See United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662,664-65 
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States 469 U.S. 1208 
(1985) (holding that 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) subjects employees to criminal 
prosecution only if they knew or should have known that there had been no 
compliance with the permit requirement of§ 6925); see also 126 CONG. REc. 
H3368 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1980). 
286. See Kadish, supra note 268, at 285-86 (summarizing BARBARA 
WOOTION, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1966)); see also Sayre, supra 
note 268, at 55, 73, 84 (supporting conviction for criminal syndicalism or 
sedition cases in absence of intent by analogizing to public welfare offenses). 
But see Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (preserving notions of 
proportionality in criminal sentencing). 
287. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985). 
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do so seems rational based on the assumption that Congress would 
legislate in light of general principles governing the criminal 
law.2ss 
Identifying the background assumptions of the criminal law, 
however, may be no mean feat. While the Supreme Court would 
appear to rely on traditional principles of the criminal law, 
examination of three leading cases demonstrates that over time, the 
Supreme Court has found somewhat different background 
assumptions to guide their interpretation of ambiguous language. 
1. Morissette v. United States 
Morissette289 involved a statute, like 42 U .S.C. § 6928, in 
which Congress used the term "knowingly" without clearly 
defining the elements to which it attached. 18 U.S.C. § 641 
provides that "[w]hoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly 
convens to his use or the use of another . . . any . . . thing of 
value of the United States ... [s]hall be fined ... or imprisoned 
... or both. "290 
Morissette entered a large tract of the government's land 
where he hoped to hunt for deer. Unsuccessful in his efforts to 
kill a deer, he hoped to recoup the expenses of his trip by 
salvaging a large quantity of rusting, spent bomb cases, apparently 
discarded by the Air Force. 291 Morissette freely admitted his 
conduct and told an investigator that "he had no intention of 
stealing but thought the property was abandoned, unwanted and 
considered of no value to the Government. "292 The trial court 
refused to allow Morissette to defend on the ground that he 
288. See id. at 426 (Brennan, J., noting that the failure of Congress to 
unambiguously indicate intent does not signal a departure from basic 
assumptions of criminal law, thus inferring that Congress • intent or 
understanding is that basic rules of criminal law are to be followed); see also 
United States v. Agrillo-Ladlad, 675 F.2d 905, 909-10 (7th Cir. 1982); State v. 
Hooper, 386 N.E.2d 1348, 1349-50 (Ohio 1979); LAFAVE, supra note 106, at 
75 (use of canons of construction). 
289. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 248 (1952). 
290. 18 u.s.c. § 641. 
291. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 247. 
292. !d. at 248. 
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thought that the property was abandoned and, instead, instructed 
the jury that "[t]he question on intent is whether or not he intended 
to take the property. "293 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court framed the issue as 
the court of appeals had and treated the case as one in which 
Congress had omitted "any mention of criminal intent. "294 The 
court of appeals had relied on two earlier Supreme Court decisions 
in which Congress was silent on mens rea, in which cases the 
Supreme Court had found an intent to make the offenses strict 
liability offenses. 295 
In light of the explicit reference to the term "knowingly" in 
18 U.S.C. § 641, the characterization of the statute as silent on 
mens rea seems odd. More importantly, the Court was not merely 
content to define the necessary elements of 18 U.S.C. § 641 and 
to ask whether "knowingly convert" demonstrated an intent to 
distinguish an innocent converter, liable in tort,296 from a 
culpable offender, chargeable with a criminal offense. 297 Had 
the Court done so, it would have reached the same result as it did, 
that Morissette was entitled to defend on the basis of his belief that 
the property was abandoned. But the decision would have been of 
minor importance. 
Instead, Justice Jackson offered a comprehensive discussion 
of common law crimes and public welfare statutes and the different 
presumptions that attach when a court is called upon to determine 
the mens rea in a given offense.298 Given the Court's conclusion 
that Morissette's offense was not a public welfare statute, the 
Court 's discussion on point is dicta, albeit influential. The 
distinction between mala in se and mala prohibitum has been 
recognized as a basis of determining legislative intent, absent 
293. /d. at 249. 
294. /d. at 250. 
295. /d. at 249-50 (referring to United States v. Behrman, 258 U .S. 280 
(1922) and United States v. Balint, 258 U .S. 250 (1922)) . 
296. See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270; see also Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 222A(l) (1976). 
297. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 270. 
298. /d. at 270-73. 
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unambiguous language or clear intent. 299 
Morissette's discussion of the mens rea requirement for 
common law crimes is consistent with the Court 1 s discussion of the 
background assumptions of the criminal law today. Justice 
Jackson asserted that "[t]he contention that an injury can amount 
to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or 
transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems 
of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent 
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good 
and evil. "300 
More troubling was Justice Jackson 1 s discussion of public 
welfare offenses. He defined broadly instances in which Congress 
would be presumed to have intended no mens rea, despite severe 
penalties that might attach to the conduct. 301 He suggested that 
to impose liability in such cases, while criticized by "responsible 
and disinterested students of penology"302 was exclusively the 
province of Congress. 303 For example, he accepted acritically 
that most often mala prohibitum offenses provide for "relatively 
small" penalties and do "no grave damage to an offender's 
reputation. "304 Despite recognizing that some commentators had 
expressed misgivings305 about the line between public welfare 
and traditional common law offenses, Justice Jackson suggested no 
limits on Congress 1 s power to draw the line or the Court's 
299. See LAFAVE, supra note 106, at 79. ("Other things being equal, 
• statutes ' involving morally bad conduct should be construed more strictly 
t~an those involving conduct not so bad."). 
300. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 
2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
301. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 258-59. 
302. Id. at 254 n.14. 
303. Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251-52 
(1922)); see also Morissette, 342 U .S. at 256. 
304. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256; see also United States v. Balint, 258 
U.S. 250, 251 (1922) (subjecting defendant to possible five year sentence under 
Narcotics Act of December 17, 1914, c. 1, 38 Stat. 785). 
305. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 256. 
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willingness to follow that line. 306 
Morissette established a presumption of congressional intent. 
But it imposed a presumption in favor of a mens rea requirement 
when the offense was a common law offense. The Court stated that 
"where Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated 
the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it 
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were 
attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from 
which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the 
judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. "307 Under Morissette's 
approach, if a defendant could not demonstrate that the offense had 
common law origins, then a statute silent on a requisite mens rea 
where no clear congressional intent could otherwise be established, 
would be read literally to allow imposition of liability without any 
showing of blameworthiness. 308 Otherwise innocent conduct 
could lead to a felony conviction and a term of imprisonment, 
apart from Morissette's reassurance that penalties associated with 
mala prohibitum offenses are usually relatively small. 309 
2. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. 
In International Minerals, 310 the corporate defendant was 
charged with shipping sulfuric and hydrofluosilicic acid without a 
306. Id. at 275 (Jackson, J ., writing for the majority, failed to set any 
limitations on the Court's holding). See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
303 (1983) (reversing a life imprisonment sentence for violation of a seventh 
non-violent felony due to limitations based upon notions of proportionality and 
cruel & unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); see also State v. 
Guminga, 395 N.W.2d 344, 349 (Minn. 1986) (holding that a statute which 
imposes vicarious criminal liability on an employer whose employee serves 
intoxicating liquor to a minor violates due process). 
307. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952). 
308. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 43-44 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). 
309. Id. Compare with United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,285 
(1943). 
310. United States v. Int' I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U. S. 558 
(1971). 
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proper label that the liquids were corrosive. 311 That was a 
violation of an Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation 
promulgated under 18 U.S.C. § 834(a)312 and made a criminal 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 834(t) which provided that whoever 
"knowingly violates any such regulation"313 shall be fined or 
imprisoned. 
The issue before the Court was whether "'knowledge' of the 
regulation is . . . required. "314 Initially, the Court rejected the 
idea that without imposing a requirement of knowledge of the 
regulation the offense imposed strict liability. After all, argued 
Justice Douglas, "knowledge of the shipment of the dangerous 
materials is required. "315 An accused could defend on the basis 
that he thought that the liquid shipped was harmless. 316 
International Minerals did not explicitly address whether the 
Act was ambiguous. But it did address both the legislative history 
and what might be characterized as the relevant background 
assumption of the criminal law. In 1960, Congress considered 
amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 834 and, according to the majority, 
it demonstrated that Congress did not intend to abandon the 
general rule that ignorance of the law is no defense. 317 In fact, 
despite what would appear to be a plausible reading of the 
Act, 318 the Court relied heavily on "the general rule that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse . ... "319 
The Court acknowledged Morissette's insistence that mens 
311. Id. at 559. 
312. 18 U.S.C. § 834(a) (1971) (repealed (1979)). 
313. 18 U.S.C. § 834(f) (1971) (repealed (1979)). 
314. Int '/Minerals, 402 U.S. at 560. 
315. Id. at 565 (referring to United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 
(1961), which held that notice attatches to the object); see also btt 'I Minerals, 
402 U.S. at 565. 
316. Id. at 563-64 ("A person thinking in good faith that he was 
shipping distilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid 
would not be covered."). 
317. Id. at 563. 
318. After all, the explicit language of the Act suggests that one must 
know of the regulation. See discussion supra notes 219-21 and accompanying 
text. 
319. Int ' / Minerals, 402 U.S. at 562. 
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rea matters. 320 But the Court focused on what has since often 
been accepted acritically as a presumption of knowledge. It 
suggested that in some cases, due process concerns might require 
knowledge of regulations: "Pencils, dental floss, paper clips may 
. . . be regulated. But they may be the type of products which 
might raise substantial due process questions if Congress did not 
require ... 'mens rea' as to each ingredient of the offense. "321 
But the Court distinguished objects that carry with them notice of 
regulation: "[W]here, as here and as in Balint and Freed, 
dangerous or deleterious devices or products or obnoxious waste 
materials are involved, the probability of regulation is so great that 
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing 
with them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation. "322 
It is not always recognized that relying on the presumption of 
knowledge, International Minerals appears to be addressing the 
constitutional minimum, not a rule of construction . Although not 
without ambiguity, the opinion seems to hold the following: the 
statutory language is ambiguous; the legislative history provides 
some support that the knowledge term does not attach to the ICC 
regulations; when in doubt, the Court should look to background 
assumptions of the criminal law to divine what Congress might 
have meant and here, the relevant background assumption is that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse. 323 Further, but in response 
to a different argument, the Court seemed to hold that due process 
may impose some mens rea requirement324 -- for example, in 
cases involving the possession of otherwise innocent objects. But 
when the object itself is dangerous, due process does not require 
that mens rea attach to the regulation. In that context, the quoted 
320. Id. at 564 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 
(1952)). 
321. Int'l Minerals, 402 U .S. at 564-65. 
322. /d. 
323. See, e.g. People v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987); 
Gardner v. People, 62 N.Y. 299 (1875). But see MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04 
(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (allowing mistake of law defense under 
exceptional circumstances). 
324. Int 'I Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564-65; see, e.g., Lambert v. California, 
355 u.s. 225, 227 (1957). 
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passage concerning the probability of regulation and the hazardous 
nature of the offending object is not a rule of construction for 
statutes like the one involved in International Minerals, but part of 
the holding that Congress had discretion to dispense with mens rea 
with respect to the "regulation" element of the offense.325 
The distinction is significant. The presumption that one must 
know of the regulations from the nature of the object does not 
become relevant unless there is a due process challenge. It is not 
a presumption that bears on legislative intent. Rephrased, it is a 
question of constitutional power, rather than congressional 
preference. That becomes important when I argue that Justice 
Douglas grossly overstated the importance of the maxim that 
"ignorance of the law is no excuse," and that reliance on other 
more important background assumptions of the criminal law might 
have produced a different result in International Minerals . 326 
3. Liparota v. United States 
As did Morisseue and International Minerals, Liparotal21 
involved a statute in which Congress used the term "knowingly," 
but left for judicial interpretation the decision about whether 
"knowingly" attached to all of the statutory elements of the 
offense. 328 As in International Minerals, the statute required the 
government to show that the defendant's conduct violated 
regulations promulgated under an administrative scheme. 329 
Frank Liparota, the co-owner of Moon's Sandwich Shop, 
purchased food stamps for substantially less than their face value. 
On one occasion, Liparota paid a Department of Agriculture 
undercover agent $150 for $195 worth of food stamps. Later, he 
bought $500 worth of food stamps for $350, and then $500 worth 
325. By contrast, a statute violates due process if it criminalizes a 
person for failing to act when her omissions are otherwise innocent. See 
Lambert, 355 U .S. at 229-30. 
326. See discussion infra notes 359-393 and accompanying text. 
327. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985). 
328. Id. at 424-25. 
329. Id. at 419. 
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of food stamps for $300.330 The transaction took place under 
circumstances that demonstrated Liparota Is guilty knowledge. 331 
Liparota was charged with violating 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(l), 
which provides in relevant part: "[W]hoever knowingly uses, 
transfers, acquires, alters or possesses coupons ... in any manner 
not authorized by this chapter or the regulations issued pursuant to 
this chapter shall . . . be guilty of a felony . . . . "332 The 
district court rejected Liparota 1 s proposed jury instruction to the 
effect that the government must prove that "the defendant 
knowingly did an act which the law forbids, purposely intending 
to violate the law. "333 The gist of the district court's instruction 
on point was that defendant in fact had to have acquired the food 
stamps in a manner that violated the law; but the only knowledge 
to be proven was that "the Defendant knowingly and wilfully 
acquired the food stamps. "334 
Justice Brennan noted that different mens rea requirements 
might attach to different elements of an offense and that other 
mens rea classifications exist besides specific and general 
intent. 335 Given the statutory language in an offense like § 2024 
and the failure of Congress to enact legislation similar to the 
Model Penal Code, 336 those possibilities really do not present 
themselves to the litigants. That is, the government was not free 
to argue that, for example, while knowledge attaches to the 
acquisition element of the offense, the government must only prove 
that Liparota should have known that his conduct violated the 
law.337 If the Court were to so hold, it would be an obvious 
330. Id. at 421-22. 
331. Id. at 434 n.17. 
332. 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b)(1) (1985) (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 2024). 
333. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 422 (1985) (quoting On 
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, Joint Appendix at 34, Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) 
(No. 84-5108) [hereinafter Writ]). 
334. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 422 (quoting Writ, supra note 333, at 33). 
335. Id. at 423-24 n.5. 
336. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (never enacted). 
337. See generally United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 
662, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 
U.S. 1208 (1985); see also Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element 
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usurpation of Congress' authority to define the elements of an 
offense. 338 
As discussed above, it is late in the day to argue that this 
statute is unambiguous. 339 Justice Brennan found that either 
interpretation, that knowledge attached to "authorized by" the law 
as urged by Liparota or that it attached only to "acquires" as 
argued by the government, "would accord with ordinary 
usage. "340 In addition, Liparota found the legislative history 
silent on the question of the proper interpretation of the Act. 341 
At that point, the Court had to turn to background 
assumptions of the criminal law. The core assumption that the 
Court relied on was that, absent a contrary purpose, mens rea 
should attach to all of the statutory elements. 342 Liparota found 
that assumption to be the teaching of Morissette. 343 The Court 
found a strong presumption in favor of implying a mens rea term. 
That was particularly the case when a contrary reading of the Act 
might "criminalize a broad range of apparently innocent 
conduct. "344 It disguished cases like United States v. Yermain, 
where the Court limited the mens rea term to the falsity of the 
defendant's statement and refused to attach knowledge to the fact 
that the defendant was dealing with a federal agency. 345 In 
Yermain, on the Court's reading of the applicable statute, the 
Analysis in Defilling Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 
STAN L. REV. 681 (seeking to emphasize the importance of the Model Penal 
Code's element analysis). 
338. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 423-24 (MOur task is to determine which 
meaning Congress intended. "The definition of the elements of a criminal 
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal 
crimes, which are solely creatures of statute."); see also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 
424 n.6 (stating that Congress must act within constitutional restraints). 
339. See discussion supra notes 200-33 and accompanying text. 
340. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 424. 
341. Id. at 423-24. 
342. !d. at 425. 
343. !d. at 425-26. 
344. !d. at 426; see also id. at 427 (supporting traditonal principles of 
lenity). But see id. at 428 (government's position regarding subsection (E)). 
345. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432. 
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government had to demonstrate that an offender was 
blameworthy. 346 
The Court addressed two arguments that have importance for 
an analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 6928. In a footnote, the Court 
responded to the dissent's argument that it was creating a "mistake 
of law" defense. 347 Justice Brennan argued, in effect, that he 
was merely interpreting the statutory language consistent with 
traditional interpretative principles. 348 By contrast, the traditional 
maxim that ignorance of the law is no excuse refers only to the 
situation in which an accused tries to deny knowledge of the very 
penal law with which he is charged. 349 Hence, Brennan 
distinguished between an accused charged with receiving stolen 
goods who cannot claim that he did not know that receipt of stolen 
goods is illegal, but can defend on the ground that he did not know 
that the good were stolen. 350 . That the goods were or were not 
stolen might tum on what technically is a question of law, such as 
who is the lawful owner of the property in question. 351 
The government also contended that the statute in question 
created a public welfare offense, that would, therefore, "'consist 
only of forbidden acts or omissions.' "352 Had the Court analyzed 
7 U.S.C. § 2024 in light of factors identified in Morissette, it 
might have concluded that dealing in paper issued pursuant to a 
federal entitlements program was not a crime at common law. 353 
346. United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 69 (1984). 
347. Liparota, 411 U.S. at 425 n.9. 
348. /d. at 422 (Brennan, J., referring to MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02 
commentary at 131 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955)). 
349. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(9) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
350. Liparota, 411 U.S. at 425 n.9. See also Regina v. Smith (David), 
(1974) 1 All E. R. 632 (defendant was able to defend against a charge of 
recklessly damaging the property of another by introducing evidence of a good 
faith belief that the property destroyed was his own). 
351. See Regina, 1 All E. R. 632, 636; see also MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL 
lAW: THE GENERAL PART§ 100, at 287 (2d ed. 1961). 
352. Liparota, 411 U.S. at 432 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 
u.s. 246, 252-53 (1952)). 
353. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 259-61. 
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The question surely would have been a close one.354 The 
Court's response certainly suggests a narrowing of the Court's 
public welfare offenses analysis. Its response to the assertion that 
7 U.S.C. § 2024 created a public welfare offense was brief: "the 
offense at issue here differs substantially from those 'public 
welfare offenses' we have previously recognized. "355 It limited 
its public welfare analysis by observing that "Congress has 
rendered criminal a type of conduct that a reasonable person 
should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may 
seriously threaten the community's health or safety .... "356 
Liparota's discussion of public welfare offenses is consistent 
with the disillusionment with strict liability offenses. 357 It 
imposes a limitation on the category of cases where the Court will 
find public welfare offenses in absence of clear congressional 
intent to the contrary. While that result is to be applauded, its 
response to the government's argument can work mischief, as it 
did in United States v. Hojlin. 358 In context, the Court seems to 
have created a presumption that when Congress does regulate 
subjects that effect "the community's health or safety, "359 it 
intends to impose strict liability on the offender on the irrebuttable 
presumption that a person is negligent for failing to know of the 
regulations. The Court's citation to International Minerals is 
misplaced. 360 As discussed above, International Minerals 
created no such presumption. 361 There, the Court relied on the 
notice inherent in the possession of dangerous objects in discussing 
whether due process is violated if no mens rea attaches to an 
element of an offense. By contrast, International Minerals 
suggested that if the defendant is in violation of a regulation of an 
354. See also United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 45 (8th Cir. 1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). 
355. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 432-33. 
356. Id. at 433. 
357. ld. at 431-33. 
358. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
359. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 433. 
360. Id. 
361. See discussion supra notes 321-323 and accompanying text. 
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otherwise innocent activity due process may be violated "if 
Congress did not require . .. 'mens rea' as to each ingredient of 
the offense. "362 
Liparota creates a strong presumption against criminalizing 
conduct that might otherwise be innocent and in favor of reading 
liberally any mens rea requirement found within a federal statute. 
But it careless! y suggested a separate category of cases when 
Congress is regulating otherwise harmful activity. There, without 
deciding the question, Liparota suggests a different presumption 
concerning congressional intent when a statute regulates dangerous 
activity. International Minerals, the Court's support for that view, 
hardly justifies its conclusion. 
V. SORTING Our BACKGROUND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 
Absent plain meaning and clear legislative intent to the 
contrary, International Minerals was unwilling to assume that 
Congress intended to make knowledge of a particular regulation an 
element of the offense. It did so in large part because "it is too 
much to conclude that . . . the House [intended to] carv[ e] out an 
exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no 
excuse. "363 Justice Douglas should have known better. 
It was after all Justice Douglas who wrote the Court's 
opinion in Lambert v. California, 364 in which the Supreme Court 
struck down a local ordinance that imposed a registration 
requirement on any convicted person who remained in Los Angeles 
for more than five days. 365 The Court found that the ordinance 
violated the due process notice requirement in that it applied to a 
person "who has no actual knowledge of his duty to register. "366 
The Court did suggest that nothing in Lambert's circumstances 
362. United States v. Int ' 1 Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 
564-65 (1971) . 
363. Id. at 563. 
364. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
365. !d. at 228-29. 
366. !d. at 227. 
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would lead her "to inquire as to the necessity of registration. "367 
Despite some ominous language in Justice Frankfurter's 
dissent, 368 Lamben did not usher in a general defense of 
ignorance of the law.369 But it stands as one of a number of 
areas where ignorance of the law is excusable, where an offender's 
fault for not knowing is so lacking that it is unfair to punish the 
offender. 370 
More to the point, however, commentators371 and some 
courts372 have long recognized that the claim that ignorance of 
the law is no excuse is overstated. The generalization that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse remains largely true in two 
classes of cases. First, those cases in which a defendant contends 
that he was ignorant of the law with which he has been 
charged;373 and, second, those cases in which the offender is 
aware of the law, concludes reasonably and in good faith that it 
does not apply to him, but guesses wrong. 374 On occasion, most 
367. ld. at 229. 
368. ld. at 230 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
369. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 232 (1957) (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting). See also Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 537 (1982); see also 
United States v. Freed, 410 U.S. 601, 608 (1971); MODEL PENAL CODE § 
2.02(9) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
370. See Coxv. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559,566-67 (1965); see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE§ 2.04 commentary at 274-75 (1985). 
371. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04 commentary at 274-75 (1985); 
Ronald A. Cass, Ignorance of the Law: A Maxim Reexamined, 17 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 671, 689-95 (1976); George P. Fletcher, The Individualization 
of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1295-99 (1974); Henry W. 
Seney, ""When Empty Te"ors Overawe"--Our Criminal Law Defenses (Part Two), 
19 WAYNE L. REV. 1359, 1364-76 (1973). 
372. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 420 (1985); 
Lambert, 355 U.S. 225 (1957); United States v. Simpson, 561 F. 2d 53, 61-62 
(7th Cir. 1977); United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 827-28 (9th 
Cir. 1976). 
373. See, e.g., Morgan v. Dist. of Columbia, 476 A.2d 1128, 1133 (D.C. 
App. 1984); United States v. Currier, 621 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1980); State v. 
Clark, 346 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1984); State v. Weitzman, 427 A.2d 3, 6-7 (N.H. 
1981). 
374. See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART 
§ 101, at 288-89 (2d ed. 1961). 
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importantly in regulatory offenses, courts face situations in which 
the offender seems entirely blameless. Nonetheless, largely based 
on a utilitarian rationale, courts follow Justice Holmes' argument 
that "justice to the individual is rightly outweighed by the larger 
intereStS On the Other Side Of the SCaleS [the general good). "375 
Courts and legislatures have created narrow exceptions to the 
rule where a defendant has gone beyond merely reading the statute 
and misconstruing its language. 376 For example, the Model 
Penal Code recognizes five situations in which a defendant has an 
affirmative defense of proving a reasonable mistake of law:m 
it recognizes a claim of inadequate publication of the law;378 it 
also recognizes four situations in which the defendant has relied on 
a later determined invalid or erroneous interpretation of the 
law. 379 Again largely for utilitarian policy concerns, the Model 
Penal Code, like the common law, does not allow a claim that the 
defendant relied on advice of counsel. 380 
The categories hardly seem principled. The categories do 
identify blameless, reasonable actors who are excused because of 
their mistake concerning the law. But the line falls far short of 
providing a defense to all blameless actors whose mistake is one 
375. See People v. Marrero, 507 N.E. 2d 1068, 1069 (N.Y. 1987) 
(quoting OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1881); see also supra 
note 374 at 288-89. But see Immanuel Kant, 17te Philosophy Of Law, in THE 
GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 237, 257 (Clarence Morris ed. 1971) ("(o]ne 
man ought never to be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the 
purpose of another ... "). 
376. See also Ma"ero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069-70 (precluding mistake of 
law exception despite language of N.Y. Penal Law§ 15.20). 
377. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
378. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(3)( a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
379. !d. § 2.04(3)(b ). See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568-71 
(1%5) (allowing an exception to mistake of law rule where defendant 
reasonably relies on public officer's enforcement of the law); United States 
v. Albertini, 830 F.2d 985, 989-90 (9th Cir. 1987) (allowing an exception to 
mistake of law rule where defendant reasonably relies on judicial opinion); 
Long v. State, 165 A.2d 489 (1949) (allowing an exception to mistake of law 
where defendant reasonably relies on legality of divorce proceedings); State 
v. Godwin, 31 S.E. 221 (N.C. 1898) (reasonably relying on a statute later 
found unconstitutional). 
380. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04 commentary at 279-280 (1985). 
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of law. 381 Lamben demonstrates the kind of ad hoc line that 
exists in the field. There, a convicted felon, picked up on 
suspicion of another offense, was charged under a Los Angeles 
ordinance that required a convicted felon to register with the police 
if she remained in Los Angeles for a more than five days. 382 The 
Court held that Lambert's conviction violated the notice provision 
of the due process clause. 383 
Lamben might have been grounded on the absence of the 
offender's blameworthiness in failing to know the law. Obviously, 
Lambert's failure to know the unusual provision of law could be 
distinguished from an offender who claimed ignorance of the law 
of theft or murder. 384 A line based on blameworthiness would 
have been principled. Had the Court gone that route, any number 
of defendants would be able to argue that the unusual nature of a 
particular regulatory crime made their lack of knowledge 
defensible. 385 But the Court stopped far short of such a holding. 
Instead, it narrowed Lamben to situations dealing with crimes 
involving "conduct that is wholly passive -- mere failure to 
register. "386 Not all omissions were within the Court's 
holding. 387 More importantly, Justice Douglas suggested that a 
person whose crime involves an act will be put on notice of the 
possibilty that the conduct is unlawful. 388 
381. See, e.g., People v. 0' Brien 31 P. 45, 46-47 (Cal. 1892); Oakland 
v. Carpentier, 21 Cal. 642 (1863); Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (1836); Rex 
v. Bailey, 168 Eng. Rep. 651 (1800). 
382. Lambert v. California, 355 U .S. 225, 226 (1957). 
383. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 227. It is worth noting that defendant was 
denied an opportunity to defend on lack of knowledge, id. at 227. 
384. Cf. Rex v. Esop, 173 Eng. Rep. 203 (1936) (not allowing an 
ignorance of the law defense where the act of sodomy was not criminal in the 
defendant's native country). 
385. Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, LAw & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401, 433-36 (1958) (criticizing the Lambert decision). 
386. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228. 
387. I d. at 229 (Douglass, J ., distinguishing the statute in question from 
statutes requiring the licensing of businesses); see also United States v. 
Dotterweich, 320 U .S. 277, 285 (1943) (involving interstate transport of 
misbranded drugs); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250,251 (1922) (involving 
sale of drugs). 
388. Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228. 
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Lamben's distinctions have been widely criticized. 389 At 
a minimum, Lamben demonstrates the ambivalence of courts in 
defining the law governing ignorance of the law. It has hardly had 
a settled course. 
Cases like Liparota, International Minerals, and the cases 
interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 6928 represent a distinct line of mistake 
of law cases. Unlike the defendant who claims ignorance of the 
law with which he is charged or ignorance about its interpretation, 
the defendant in Liparota argued that knowledge of the law was a 
material element of offense and that his ignorance of the law 
negated a material element of the offense. 390 
The common law distinguished between specific and general 
intent offenses, whereby ignorance of the law was relevant only if 
the defendant was charged with a specific intent offense.391 The 
most obvious examples, of course, were cases involving good faith 
mistakes concerning ownership of property in theft and related 
offenses. 392 More recent proposals have abandoned the 
distinction as unfounded. 393 As described by the Model Penal 
Code, this class of cases involves a situation in which "[t]he 
culpability issue is essentially the same for a given offense 
whatever the abstract classification of the error that is asserted. 
u394 
389. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKJNG CRIMINAL LAw 424-25 
(1978); see also Henry M. Hart, 11te Aims of the Criminal Law, LAw & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 433-36 (1958). 
390. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 (1985). Compare with 
MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
391. See Williams, supra note 374, at 294. 
392. See, e.g., State v. Ebbeler, 223 S.W. 396 (Mo. 1920); Regina v. 
Smith (David), (1974) 1 All E. R. 632. 
393. MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 2.02, 2.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) 
(setting out mens rea requirement and allowing a defense when requisite mens 
rea not proven). But see State v. Woods, 179 A. 1, 2-3 (Vt. 1935) (holding 
that a "guilty mind" by defendant not required for conviction). 
394. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.04 commentary at 270 n.2 (1985). The 
Model Penal Code's approach should hardly be surprising to a student of the 
criminal law. It reflects the predominant view that culpability is a necessary 
condition for punishment. As I have developed elsewhere, commentators of 
every political persuasion have urged that retribution is the primary 
justification for punishment. See Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering 
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What emerges in legal commentaries, case law, and 
codifications like the Model Penal Code, is a general rule that 
where a mens rea term is provided or implied395 it attaches to all 
material elements of an offense. 396 Further, if the material 
element of the offense involves a question of law, like lawful 
authority, the mens rea term applies equally to that material 
element. Liparota reflects the same understanding of statutory 
construction. With regard to 42 U.S.C. § 6928, there would 
appear to be no coherent reason to abandon that traditional 
understanding. In other words, insofar as the Third Circuit would 
run the knowledge term all the way to attach to the permit 
requirement, 397 Johnson & Towers is entirely consistent with the 
law governing mens rea and mistake of law. 
Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1012 (1991). The Supreme Court has 
suggested that sentencing a nonculpable offender to a term of imprisonment 
may be a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 
290-94 (1983). 
Liparota v. United States is largely consistent with that theme. Justice 
Brennan argued that culpability is the predominant background assumption 
of the criminal law. Liparota, 471 U.S. 419, 425-26 (1985). When a court 
must analyze whether a mens rea term attaches to a material element, the 
maxim concerning ignorance of the law is simply inapplicable. Once that 
point is recognized, the Court should have simply concluded that United States 
v. Int'l Minerals & Cltem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1943), was wrongly decided. 
As it stands, Liparota 's analysis, consistent with Model Penal Code §§ 2.02( 4) 
and 2.04(1), and Liparota 's weak attempt to distinguish Int 'I Minerals are 
irreconcilable and can only produce confusion. 
395. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft 
1%2); see also Regina v. Smith (David), (1974) 1 All E. R. 632. 
3%. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02( 4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); 
see also ld. § 2.04(1) (treating mistake of fact and mistake of law in the same 
way). 
397. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 (3d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985). 
But see id. at 664-65 (holding that "knew or should have known" is the 
standard). 
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VI. PUBLIC POLICY AND IGNORANCE OF THE LAW 
As indicated above, one traditional and strong justification for 
the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse is the 
utilitarian argument that "justice to the individual is rightly 
outweighed by the larger interests on the other side of the 
scales. "398 The same kind of utilitarian justification underlies the 
strict liability requirement in mala prohibitum offenses. 399 
Indeed, the court in Hojlin relied on the fact that, despite the 
presence of a mens rea term, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 was a public 
welfare offense, justifying a narrow construction of the mens rea 
term. 400 This section discusses whether the competing interests 
identified by Justice Holmes, justice to the individual and 
important public interests, can be accommodated without 
criminalizing an otherwise blameless individual. 
Courts have traditionally justified punishment of an offender 
without allowing an ignorance of the law defense or without a 
mens rea element at all largely on similar grounds. As explained 
by one state court, "[t]he usual rationale for strict liability statutes 
is that the public interest is so great as to warrant the imposition 
of an absolute standard of care . . . . "401 That is especially true 
in cases, like traffic offenses, where the prosecutor may need to 
try a large number of offenders without the added and difficult 
burden of establishing a knowledge or mens rea element. 402 In 
partial response to the criticism that the result is unjust, some 
courts have argued that mala prohibitum offenses carry minor 
penalties; in effect, they are civil cases. 403 That ignores both the 
stigma attaching to the criminal charges and the real possibility of 
imprisonment in some instances. A further argument to support 
strict liability offenses and to justify disallowing the ignorance of 
398. See Holmes, supra note 375, at 48. 
399. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 259-61 (1952). 
400. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F. 2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
401. State v. Collova, 255 N.W. 2d 581, 585 (Wis. 1977). 
402. Commonwealth v. Smith, 44 N.E. 503, 504 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, 
J., writing for the majority). 
403. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U .S. 246, 256 (1952). 
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the law defense is that we can trust prosecutors not to proceed and 
juries not to convict blameless offenders.404 With regard to 
disallowing an ignorance of the law defense, the additional 
argument has been made that people are aware of the law.405 
Each of these arguments has been criticized in an ample 
literature attacking strict liability and the general absence of an 
ignorance of the law defense. 406 But whatever efficacy the 
arguments may have, for example, within the context of regulating 
traffic offenses,407 the arguments appear singularly unpersuasive 
within the context of federal regulatory schemes. 
Congress commonly establishes regulatory schemes with a 
wide array of enforcement remedies. The pattern varies, but the 
agency may initially be empowered to negotiate with the regulated 
entity;408 thereafter, it may be able to seek injunctive relief,409 
attach assets, 410 seek civil or criminal penalties and fines. 411 
In some instances, especially in cases involving egregious 
behavior, the agency may be able to seek or have the Justice 
Department seek a criminal indictment. 41 2 
The Internal Revenue Code provides an example of the 
government's power to use a variety of enforcement tools. As 
with many federal regulatory schemes, 413 the tax code is 
404. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943); see 
also Long v. State, 65 A.2d 489 (Del. 1989). 
405. See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 132 So. 870, 871 (Ala. 1931); Satterfield 
v. State, 109 N.W.2d 415, 418 (Neb. 1961). 
406. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.04 commentary at 274-75 (1985); see 
also Cass, supra note 371, at 689-99; Fletcher, supra, note 371, at 1295-99; 
Seney, supra note 371, at 1364-76. 
407. Sayre, supra note 268, at 87 n.6. 
408. 21 U .S.C. § 462 (1972). See also Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated 
Rulemaking and Administrative Law, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 471, 471 (1986). 
409. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2805(b )(2) (1992). 
410. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 6332(d). 
411. See Jackson v. Concord Cas., 253 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1969); see 
also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517-18 (1911). 
412. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (1992) 
413. For example, the EPA administers 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6) (1987), 
which provides civil and criminal penalties for polluting waters where the goals 
of the act, as stated in 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1987), are to "maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." Another 
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designed with a primary objective that is noncriminal, here the 
collection of revenue. 414 Criminal sanctions are available for tax 
evaders,415 largely on utilitarian deterrence grounds. No doubt, 
like the schemes discussed in Morissette, crimes under the Internal 
Revenue Code would be mala prohibitum. 
Congress has never attempted to define crimes under the code 
as strict liability offenses. In fact, the Supreme Court has 
consistently over a sixty year period read the willful element found 
in Title 26 offenses as to require not only knowledge of fact, but 
also knowledge of the law.416 Most recently , for example, the 
Court reversed a decision by the Seventh Circuit that held that the 
tax payer could raise a good faith misunderstanding of the law 
only if the defendant's beliefs were reasonable.417 Instead, the 
Court held that the appropriate standard was whether the defendant 
made a good faith mistake. That was so even though the mistake 
involved a question of law. 418 
Cheek419 and other cases interpreting criminal 
provisions420 under the tax laws are interesting for a number of 
reasons. Even if the crime is a misdemeanor, Congress has 
included a mens rea term.421 Further, the Court has interpreted 
that term to allow a good faith claim of ignorance of the law.422 
Apart from the interpretative problems, the regulatory goals of the 
congressional scheme are not impaired by imposing a fault 
requirement even where, as it is in Cheek, a very strict fault 
example would be the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988, 15 
U.S.C. § 78ff, which provides civil and criminal penalties for violations of the 
Securities and Exchange Act. 
414. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-5801 (1992). 
415. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1992). 
416. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 395-98 (1933). 
417. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610-11 (1991). 
418. !d. at 611. 
419. !d. 
420. See, e.g., United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976); United 
States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973) (interpreting I.R.C. § 7206-7207); United 
States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389 (1933) (interpreting the Revenue Act of 1926, 
§ 1114(a) and the Revenue Act of 1928, § 146). 
421. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1992). 
422. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610-11 (1991). 
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requirement. 423 
Much the same can be said about federal environmental laws. 
Contrary to the presumption of Morissette, whereby the Court 
found less need for a mens rea requirement in mala prohibitum 
offenses because of the need for efficient enforcement, the reality 
of regulatory schemes today demonstrates that the enforcement 
goals and traditional notions of fault are not incompatible. Hence, 
what appeared to be the foundation of the distinction in Morissette, 
that abandoning mens rea was the only way in which to enforce 
regulatory goals, is largely contradicted by the facts. Important 
public policy concerns need not be impaired even if a court or a 
legislature imposes a fault requirement. 424 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The confusion created by 42 U.S.C. § 6928 requires 
Supreme Court resolution of this question. Currently, litigants in 
different circuits receive unequal treatment under the law. 
The split among the circuits certainly invites the Supreme 
423. !d. at 610 (requiring the government in criminal tax cases to prove 
that "the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this 
duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty"). 
424. See United States v. Int 'I Minerals & Chern. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 
(1971); see also United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 664-65 
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Angel v. United States, 469 U.S. 1208 
(1985). The Court held that "knew or should have known" is the standard. 
It may be that the problem is setting the appropriate fault standard, although 
these cases suggest one standard, this is most appropriately the work of the 
legislature. Legislators, however, do not address this problem often enough. 
Some commentators have argued that civil enforcement provisions do not 
provide adequate protection for the enviroment. See, e.g., Robert A. Milne, 
Comment, The Mens Rea Requirements Of 17te Federal Environmental Statutes: 
Stn'ct Criminal Liability in Substance But Not Fomt, 37 B UFF. L. REV., 307, 
318-20 (1988-89). That position ignores other enforcement devices such as 
injunctive relief and passing on clean up costs. In addition, consistent with 
Congress's intention, see, e.g. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30, 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. 6238, 6268, I have argued that criminal 
sanctions should be reserved for truly blameworthy offenders, and that 
criminalizing only truly blameworthy people will not impair the legitimate 
goals of protecting the environment. 
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Court to grant review. 425 This article has argued that the 
approach taken by the Third Circuit is the correct interpretation of 
42 U.S.C. § 6928 and, therefore, should be adopted by the 
Supreme Court. 426 Given the ambiguous language of the Ac~27 
and the uncertain legislative history,428 the Court should analyze 
42 U.S.C. § 6928 consistent with Liparota and Model Penal Code 
provisions governing statutory construction.429 The argument to 
the contrary ,430 that to attach knowledge to the permit 
requirement would create an ignorance of the law defense, misses 
the mark. The maxim that ignorance of the law is no defense has 
no application in cases involving statutes where the mens rea term 
attaches to a material element that itself may involve a question of 
law.43t 
The courts that have given narrow construction to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6928 have been influenced by the need to protect the 
environment. 432 That goal is obviously critically important. But 
the Ninth Circuit, for example, assumes acritically that allowing 
a defendant to demonstrate a lack of knowledge of the permit 
requirement would impair environmental protection goals.433 
425. Sup. Ct. R. 10.1(a) (1990) ("a petition for writ will be granted 
"[w]hen a United States court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
matter . . .. "). 
426. See discussion supra notes 386-93 and accompanying text. 
427. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1992). 
428. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.CA.N. 6238; H.R. REP. No., 1444 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 
1980 U.S.C.CA.N. 5028; H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 5576. 
429. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); see also, 
MODEL PENAL CODE§§ 2.02, 2.04(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
430. See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425; see also United States v. 
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
431. See discussion supra notes 386-93 and accompanying text. 
432. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990) (stating that the Court • s conclusion is 
consistent with the purpose ofRCRA where "the overriding concern ofRCRA 
is the grave danger to people and the environment from hazardous wastes"). 
433. United States v. Hoflin, 880 F. 2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S. Ct. 1143 (1990). 
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Given the wide array of enforcement mechanisms in the regulatory 
scheme, 434 the environment can be protected without risking the 
incarceration of an offender whose conduct was not blameworthy. 
Review by the Supreme Court of the intercircuit conflict 
would give it another opportunity to clarify the rules governing 
statutory construction. As discussed above, the Court's approach 
is hardly consistent. 435 But Liparota demonstrated the strong 
influence of the Model Penal Code's general culpability 
provisions.436 Justice Brennan's opinion did not adopt those 
provisions. For example, the Court did not overrule cases like 
International Minerals, cases that would have come out differently 
under the Code. 437 But the actual holding in Liparota was 
consistent with those provisions. In light of Congress's inability 
to enact coherent criminal law reform,438 engrafting the Code's 
provisions may be the best way to bring coherence to statutory 
construction cases involving federal criminal laws. 
434. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (d)(g)(h) (1992) (prescribing vanous 
enforcement provisions). 
435. See discussion supra notes 209-29 and accompanying text. 
436. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 425-28 (1985) 
(Brennan, J ., choosing to have the term "knowingly" apply as a material 
element of statute where Congress was silent as to what mens rea term should 
apply). 
437. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02( 4) (Proposed Official Draft 
1962). Under this approach, "knowingly" would have attached to the term 
"regulation." See discussion supra notes X-Y and accompanying text. 
438. S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302 (1979) (never enacted). 
